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José Luis Alonso
THE BIBLIOTHEKE ENKTESEON 
AND THE ALIENATION OF REAL SECURITIES 
IN ROMAN EGYPT*
1. POTESTAS ALIENANDI
Real securities count among the best studied legal institutions inGraeco-Egyptian law. Much of the scholarly interest behind this
result was stirred by an unexpected feature that very soon caught the
attention of a generation of papyrologists educated in the categories of
Roman Law: in the papyri, the debtor appeared deprived of his faculty to
alienate. For the likes of Mitteis and Rabel, this was a rather exotic fea-
ture, that called for an explanation.1 In Roman law, as we know it through
Justinian’s Digest, the debtor kept his potestas alienandi. This did not harm
a Roman creditor, who had what we call a ‘real’ claim, that is, a claim on
* This article elaborates on some of the ideas I presented at the 64th session of the
Societé International d’Histroire de Droit d’Antiquité «Fernand de Visscher» in Bar -
celona, in September 2010. I would like to thank Jakub Urbanik (Warsaw) for the
 fruitful discussions and suggestions, and Jolanta Urbanikowa (Warsaw) for her  linguistic
assistance.
1 Hence some of the first monographic studies on the real securities in the papyri are
devoted to this question: most notoriously, E. Rabel, Die Verfügungsbeschränkungen des
Verpfänders, Leipzig 1909, and R. de Ruggiero, Il divieto d ’alienazione del pegno nel diritto
greco e romano, Cagliari 1910. The latest study is H.-A. Rupprecht, ‘Veräußerungsverbot
und Gewährleistung in pfandrechtlichen Geschäften’, PapCongr. XXI, pp. 870–880.
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the thing against anyone, including the new owner.2 Alienation was possi-
ble for the Roman debtor, because the right of the creditor was not con-
structed as ownership, but as a limited ‘real’ right,3 thus compatible with
the debtor’s ownership, which therefore needed not be suspended. These
principles were so well established that for the Roman Jurisprudence even
a voluntary agreement to the contrary, by which the debtor renounced his
faculty to alienate, posed a problem as potentially contra ius.4
There was a restriction to the Roman principle, though. Even in
Roman law, freedom to alienate was held only for immovables, and with
2 The Greek notion that the sale of the hypothecated property is incompatible with the
right of the creditor seems to survive behind the anxiety of some provincial creditors who
presented such cases to Diocletian, who paternally reminds them of the basics of Roman
Law, that grants them a claim against any new owner. The ensuing constitutions were
promulgated in 293, and are preserved in Justinian’s Codex. CJ. 8.27.12: ‘Idem AA et CC.
[Impp. Diocletianus et Maximianus] Zotico: Si debitor rem tibi iure pignoris obligatam te
non consentiente distraxit, dominium cum sua causa transtulit ad emptorem.’ – ‘The
Same Emperors and Caesars to Zoticus: If your debtor sold the property, which was
pledged to you, without your consent, the ownership of the same together with its encum-
brance passes to the purchaser’. CJ. 8.13.15: ‘Idem AA et CC. [Impp. Diocletianus et Max-
imianus] Basilidae: Debitorem neque vendentem neque donantem neque legantem vel per
fideicommissum relinquentem posse deteriorem facere creditoris condicionem certissi-
mum est. unde si tibi obligatam rem probare posse confidis, pignora persequi debes.’ –
‘The Same Emperors and Caesars to Basilida: It is certain that a debtor cannot prejudice
the rights of a creditor by either selling, donating, bequeathing, or leaving under a trust
the property pledged, and therefore if you can prove that it was pledged to you, you can
assert your right to the same.’ (trans. Scott).
3 For the emergence of these limited real rights in Roman Law, cf. a short summary with
lit. in J. L. Alonso, ‘Hypallagma or the Dangers of Romanistic Thinking’, PapCongr.
XXVI (in print), sub vi.
4 D. 20.5.7.2 (Marcianus sing. ad form. hyp.): ‘Quaeritur, si pactum sit a creditore, ne liceat
debitori hypothecam vendere vel pignus, quid iuris sit, et an pactio nulla sit talis, quasi
contra ius sit posita, ideoque veniri possit. et certum est nullam esse venditionem, ut
pactioni stetur.’ – ‘If the creditor has obtained an agreement that it shall be unlawful for
the debtor to sell the hypothecated or pledged property, it is asked what the law is, and
whether an agreement of this kind is void as contrary to the law, and therefore the prop-
erty can be sold. And it is certain that the sale will be void, so that the agreement is kept’.
The unexpected final sentence has made the text into a crux, on which the literature is
inexhaustible. For a review of the problem and the scholarship, cf. G. Schlichting, Die
Verfügungsbeschränkung des Verpfänders im klassischen römischen Recht, Karlsruhe 1973.
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good reason. The sale of a movable could very easily lead to the creditor’s
losing track of it, turning his theoretical right to claim it from any new
owner into a useless one. Hence, in the case of movables, their sale by the
debtor was considered theft, even when he did not have to physically steal
them from the creditor, because they had remained in his possession.5
Regarding immovables, instead, the situation of the Greek debtor is
radically different to that of the Roman one. True, any buyer of a pledged
object who has not been deceitfully kept unaware of the pledge,  normally
takes care that the amount of the price necessary for its cancellation
arrives to the creditor. We may assume that this was also usually the case
when a security was bought under Roman law. But the fact that the
majority of sales imply immediate cancellation of the security does not
diminish the practical consequences of the difference between the
Roman and the Greek systems. The Roman debtor is free to sell. For the
Greek debtor, instead, even when the price is destined to the creditor,
selling is only possible with the latter’s consent.6 Since Greek securities
tend to imply forfeit, this consent is most unlikely when most needed, i.e.
when the value of the security is higher than the secured debt, as some
well known cases painfully illustrate.7 The non-alienation principle con-
13
5 D. 47.2.67 pr. (Paulus 7 Plaut.): Si is, qui rem pignori dedit, vendiderit eam: quamvis
dominus sit, furtum facit, sive eam tradiderit creditori sive speciali pactione tantum oblig-
averat: idque et Iulianus putat. – ‘If someone should sell the object that the has given in
pledge, although he is the owner, he commits a theft, whether he should deliver it to the
creditor or merely hadbound himself by agreement. Julianus holds the same opinion’. In
the case of hypothec, the theft consists in the sale itself: the object was not given to the
creditor, so the debtor does not need to physically steal it. For the more obvious theft
against the creditor who is in possession of the pledge and from whom it must be stolen,
Gai 3.200, D. 41.3.4.21 (Paulus 54 ed.), D. 41.3.49 (Labeo 5 Pith. a Paul. epit.).
6 Under Roman law, the creditor's consent was unnecessary for the debtor: the sale was
perfectly valid without it, and the buyer acquired full ownership, although the lien subsisted
and was fully enforceable against him: cf. the sources quoted supra, n. 2. The creditor’s con-
sent was interpreted as a renounce to his right, unless he declared otherwise: cf. M. Kaser,
Das römische Privatrecht I (2nd ed.), Munich 1971, p. 469 n. 74, with sources and lit.
7 In a forfeit system, a great unbalance in value between debt and security is an  anomaly,
that falls more easily upon debtors who have only one valuable asset to offer as security.
In that case, when forfeit is much more lucrative than payment, it cannot be  expected
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spires here with forfeit to sanction whatever profit the creditor may
obtain from a difference in value between the security and the secured
credit.8
Some uncertainties remain regarding the law of the papyri. The non-
alienation agreement seems to have been essential to hypallagma, a type
of real security that consists solely in such agreement, thus securing the
object for execution.9 In some hypothecs, instead, the clause is lacking,10
and we cannot know if this omission had any consequence. We also
ignore how effective the non-alienation agreement was. Invalidity for the
that the creditor will allow the debtor to sell and cancel the debt with part of the price.
For one such case, cf. the petition of Demetrius in P. Ryl. II 119 (ad 54–67, Hermopolis),
where furthermore the creditor benefited from an antichretic agreement that, to believe
the debtor, had more than paid for the debt.
8 From a purely formal point of view, such profit is balanced by the loss that the real lia-
bility principle imposes on the creditor when the difference in value turns negative. Under
normal circumstances though, it goes without saying, it is only the creditor who is in the
position to calculate risks. In the Roman system, the pledge was executed in auction, and
the debtor was entitled to recover the possible surplus (superfluum): cf. Kaser, Priva-
trecht I2 (cit. n. 6), pp. 470–471.
9 J. L. Alonso, ‘The Alpha and Omega of Hypallagma’, JJurP 38 (2008), pp. 21–27.
10 Leaving aside the incomplete documents, where we cannot know whether the clause
was or not included, Rupprecht, ‘Veräußerungsverbot’ (cit. n. 1), p. 871 n. 12, mentions
ten cases where he deems sure it was not. The list is misleading: it consists mostly of doc-
uments that actually do contain a non-alienation clause, although not one fashioned ka‹
mØ §j°stv aÈtª pvle›n mhd¢ •t°roiw Ïpot¤yesyai mhdÉ êllo tiper‹ aÈt∞w kakotexne›n
Ípenant¤on toÊtoiw trÒpƒ mhden¤ (µ tå parå taËta êkura e‰nai), but rather ka‹ parex°syv
aÈtØn én°pafon ka‹ énenexÊraston ka‹ énepidãneiston êllou dane¤ou ka‹ kayarån épÚ
basilik«n. The two clauses must indeed be differentiated, and attention must be paid to
the connection between the latter and the bebaiosis, but it seems arbitrary to admit only
the former as ‘Verfügungsverbot’. The more so, since the crucial words denying validity to
an attempted sale (êkura e‰nai) are equally rare in both: with mØ §j°stv in three papyri
(P. Erl. 127, P. Flor. I 1, P. Stras. I 52); with parex°syv in two (P. Mert. III 109, P. Oxy. XVII
2134). If we take away from the list the parex°syv-documents (BGU III 741, P. Bas. 7,
P. Hamb. I 28, P. Mert. III 109, P. Oxy. XVII 2134, PSI VIII 922, SB XIV 11705, P. Tebt. III
1 817, P. Tebt. III 2, 970), Rupprecht’s catalogue of hypothecs lacking a non-alienation
clause is reduced to three documents: P. Brem. 68 (ad 99, Hermopolis), P. Ross. Georg. II 30
(2nd cent. ad, unkown provenance), SB I 4370 (ad 228/9, Herakleopolis), to which still the
very atypical PUG II 62 (ad 98, Oxyrhynchos) must be added.
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attempted sale is prescribed in practically no hypallagma and in very few
hypothecs.11 In hypothec, even when invalidity is not explicitly agreed
upon, a full effect of the non-alienation clause, allowing the creditor to
claim the object from any buyer, may be conjectured on the basis of the
widely held opinion that sees the contract as a conditional sale, in the tra-
dition of the ancient Greek prçsiw §p‹ lÊsei, and therefore the creditor
as a conditional owner.12 For hypallagma instead, despite the fact that it
consists merely in the non-alienation agreement, there are hints that the
agreement as such had no ‘real’ effect, i.e., it would not prevent a buyer
from becoming owner.13 A strong piece of evidence in this sense are the
manifold indirect mechanisms devised to prevent the sale from actually
taking place, all quite unnecessary if the sale itself were indisputably void.
The first of such mechanisms appears in the very first documented hypal-
lagmata so far discovered: a group of well known Alexandrine synchoreseis
from the early Augustan times.14 In these earliest hypallagmata, the debtor
is deprived of his title deeds, which he will recover only when he pays his
debt. In the meantime, without the title deeds, it will obviously be diffi -
cult for him to find a buyer.15
Practices such as this re-dimension the difference between the Greek
and the Roman traditions. Strictly speaking, the hypallagmatic debtor
THE BIBLIOTHEKE ENKTESEON 15
11 For hypallagma, the only exception is P. Lond. III 1166 recto (p. 1045) (ad 42, Her-
mopolis). For hypothec, the invalidity of the attempted sale is prescribed in five cases
(supra, n. 10).
12 Thus already L. Mitteis, Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde II, 1, Leipzig –
Berlin 1912, pp. 146–147: ‘suspensiv bedingtes Eigentum’. Cf. also H. J. Wolff, Vorlesungen
über Juristische Papyruskunde (1967/68), Berlin 1998, pp. 109–110; Idem, ‘Hellenistisches Priva-
trecht’, ZRG RA 90 (1973), p. 89. For Greek law, lately, G. Thür, ‘Ownership and security in
Macedonian sale documents’, [in:] G. Thür & E. M. Harris (ed.), Symposion 2007, Vienna
2009, pp. 173–187. Contra, Rupprecht, ‘Veräußerungsverbot’ (cit. n. 1), p. 880 and n. 67–68.
13 Alonso, ‘Alpha and Omega’ (cit. n. 9), pp. 26–27, 35, 49–50.
14 BGU IV 1147, ll. 24–26; 1148, ll. 28–35; 1149, ll. 23–24; 1150 i, ll. 10–11; 1152, ll. 21–26; 1167
ii, ll. 30–31. All from the Protarchos archive, in Alexandria, and from the years 13–10 bc
For the Ptolemaic documents generally believed to be hypallagmata, cf. Alonso, ‘Alpha
and Omega’ (cit. n. 9), pp. 38–44.
15 On this practice, its function and its relevance for the early history of hypallagma, cf.
Alonso, ‘Alpha and Omega’ (cit. n. 9), pp. 27–37.
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seems to keep his postestas alienandi, just as the Roman one, although he
agrees not to make use of it, and mechanisms are devised to make sure he
does not. From the point of view of the potestas alienandi we get nearer to
the Roman system, but further than ever from the point of view of the
‘real effect’ of the guarantee: mechanisms such as this surrender of the
title deeds seem in fact to arise from the creditor’s anxiety that he would
be defenceless in front of a buyer.
2. THE BIBLIOTHEKE ENKTESEON
The rather primitive method to enforce the non-alienation clause that
has just been described, depriving the debtor of his title deeds, appears in
most of the earliest preserved examples of hypallagma: the early Augustan
synchoreseis from the Protarchos archive. Later, in the major bulk of hypal-
lagmata, from the late 1st to the mid-4th century, it is almost never men-
tioned again.16 Something seems to have happened in the 1st century that
made the old trick unnecessary. This something was very likely the cre-
ation of the bibliotheke enkteseon.17 With this new property record-office,
a much more effective way to enforce the non-alienation agreement
became available. As we know through the famous Edict of Mettius
Rufus18 reordering the allegedly chaotic affairs of the bibliotheke enkteseon
of the Oxyrhynchites, not only owners were expected to register their
16 The only exception is BGU I 301 (ad 157, Arsinoites). The practice seems to have left
echoes in some Roman imperial sources: a jurisprudential fragment from the 2nd  century,
D. 13.7.43pr. (Scaevola 5 dig.), and an imperial constitution from ad 207: C. 8.16.2. Inter-
estingly, also the contracting parties in BGU i 301 happen to be Romans.
17 For a foundation date around ad 72 (as a special section of the dhmos¤a biblioyÆkh,
created around ad 53, cf. P. Mich. IX 539–540), on the basis of a first mention of the biblio -
theke enkteseon as such in BGU I 184 (= MChr. 202, ad 72, Arsinoites), cf. H. J. Wolff, Das
Recht der Griechischen Papyri Ägyptens in der Zeit der Ptolemäer und des Prinzipats, München
1978, pp. 48–49. On the question, most recently, K. Maresch, ‘Die Bibliotheke Enktese-
on im römischen Ägypten’, APF 48 (2002), pp. 234–235.
18 Preserved in the papyrus that contains the famous petition of Dionysia, P. Oxy II 237
(after ad 186, Oxyrhynchos) viii, ll. 27–43. The Edict itself is dated to the 9th year of Domi-
tianus (ad 89).
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property: the Edict wants also creditors to register their hypothecs, and
wives and children to register the liens they may have on their husbands’
and parents’ property.19 Hypallagma is also soon attested as registered in
the bibliotheke,20 as well as many other instances whereby someone’s prop-
erty or part of it secures a debt, actual or potential.21 Although many
details of the procedure are obscure, we know that the registration of
such liens and securities left a trace in the folium assigned to the debtor
in the diastroma (the ‘general overview’ of the registered transactions that
constituted the cornerstone of the bibliotheke). That trace was an ‘addi-
tion’ (parathesis),22 that caused the ‘arrest’ of the asset, that our sources
often call a katoche.23
How this mechanism could be used to enforce the non-alienation
agreement may be illustrated by P. Wisc. II 54 (ad 116, Arsinoites), a hypal-
lagma over a slave to guarantee a loan of 456 drachms contracted through
the bibliotheke enkteseon of the Arsinoite nome. The debtor, a certain
Isarous, daughter of Apollonios, adressing the bibliophylakes, requests
them ‘not to cooperate with me in anything whatsoever until I bring for-
ward the receipts of the payment of everything’.24 The bibliophylakes are
therefore expected, until she repays the loan, to refuse their authorisation
(epistalma) until she repays the loan, if she tries to sell or further mortgage
the slave. And, as we know through the Edict of Mettius Rufus,25 it was
THE BIBLIOTHEKE ENKTESEON 17
19 P. Oxy II 237 viii, ll. 31–36.
20 Cf. Alonso, ‘Alpha and Omega’ (cit. n. 9), p. 20 n. 6. The earliest document connecting
hypallagma with the bibliotheke is P. Wisc. ii 54 (116, Arsinoites), on wich more infra, in text. 
21 For a list, still essentially complete, cf. Mitteis, Grundzüge (cit. n. 12), pp. 96–97.
22 In the Edict of Mettius Rufus the term is used for the registration of the holds of
wives and children (ll. 34–35: paratiy°tvsan d¢ ka‹ afl guna›kew t`a`›1w Ípostãsesi t«n
éndr«n §1å`n` katå tina §pix≈rion nÒmon krat∞tai tå Ípãrxonta, ktl.). It appears in our
sources not only for the registration of katochai in the debtor’s folium, but also for the reg-
istration of property, even when it is not provisional: for the prevailing but misleading
assumption that parathesis means provisional registration, cf. infra, n. 36.
23 For this katoche-parathesis, Wolff, Das Recht (cit. n. 17), pp. 235–238.
24 ... [ka‹] mØ2 sunxrhmat`¤1zesya¤ moi m2[h]d`¢`[n] èpl«w ofikon2omoÊs˙ êrxi o §p -
en°gkv é`pod≈2(sevw) è`pã`n2t(vn) épox(Æn) (ll. 17–19).
25 P. Oxy II 237 viii ll. 36–38: cf. infra, n. 31.
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forbidden to notaries to execute any contract without such epistalma.26
Identical requests to deny cooperation to any alienation attempt appear
in the parallel hypallagma contracts preserved in P. Kron. 18 (ad 143, Teb-
tynis) and P. Vars. 10 iii (ad 156, Arsinoites).27
The humble old trick of depriving the debtor of his title deeds looks
now even humbler, by comparison with this bureaucratic machinery. Yet
also this system was far from perfect.28 First of all, it depended on a dili-
gent keeping of the diastromata and the archived documents that seems to
have been an often unfulfilled ideal, as some alarmed reports reveal.29
26 On this so-called epistalma-system, see, after Mitteis, Grundzüge (cit. n. 12), pp.
97–103, above all F. von Woess, Untersuchungen über das Urkundenwesen und den Publizitäts-
schutz im römischen Ägypten, München 1924, pp. 175–201, and Wolff, Das Recht (cit. n. 17),
pp. 247–253.
27 These three documents form an important group for the history of the registration of
hypallagma. Contrary to all the previously edited hypallagma registration requests (P. Lips.
8 [= MChr. 210, ad 220, Hermopolis]; P. Lips. 9 [= MChr. 211, ad 233, Hermopolis]; and
P. Tebt. II 318 [= MChr. 218, ad 166, Tebtynis]), these are not styled as apographai or parathe-
seis, but as Ípallag∞w ÍpÒmnhma, or simply ÍpallagÆ. They are, in fact, not mere regis-
tration requests for a previously contracted hypallagma, but the contracts themselves, for-
malised through the bibliotheke. In this sense, already G. Flore, [in:] G. R. Carrara &
G. Flore, ‘Due Papiri inediti di Milano’, JJurP 15 (1965), pp. 124–127 (sub 5–7). The expres-
sion ‘contracted through the bibliotheke’, so frequent in second-century Arsinoites for
hypallagmata, is thus to be taken literally: P. Berl. Leihg. 10; P. Fam. Tebt. 29; P. Tebt. II 531
(= SB XII 10786); P. Tebt. II 389 (= MChr. 173); P. Tebt. II 440 (= P. Tebt. Wall. 7 = SB XVIII
13788); BGU IV 1038 (= MChr. 240); SB XVI 13070; cf. also Stud. Pal. XX 13 (ad 254, Arsi-
noites) and P. Erl. 76 (4th. cent. ad, Oxyrhynchos).
28 Cf., in detail, von Woess, Urkundenwesen (cit. n. 26), pp. 201–224.
29 P. Oxy II 237 viii, ll. 28–31: in ad 89, not even two decades after the foundation of the
bibliotheke enkteseon (for the foundation date around ad 72, supra, n. 17), the strategus of the
Oxyrhynchites already complains before the Praefect that ‘neither private nor public busi-
ness is receiving proper treatment owing to the fact that for many years the abstracts in
the property record-office have not been kept in the manner required’ (transl. A. S. Hunt
& C. C. Edgar, Sel. Pap. ii, 219). The problems were not limited to the Oxyrhynchites: for
Fayum, where serious trouble with the building kept lingering for decades, cf. P. Fam. Tebt.
15 (ad 114/5, Arsinoites), and therein, ll. 110–130 (= SB IV 7378): ‘His excellency Classicus
the procurator of our lord has informed me that the property record-office of the nome
is unfit for its purpose and that the documents stored in it are disappearing and are most
of them unfindable’. (trans. A. S. Hunt & C. C. Edgar, Sel. Pap. ii 422). Together with the
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 Secondly, for the event of a public deed executed by a notary without
epistalma, we know through the Gnomon of the Idios Logos of a not incon-
siderable fine of 50 drachms,30 but not whether the document was con-
sidered void. Grenfell and Hunt postulated so, but the relevant part of
the Edict of Mettius Rufus is merely their integration;31 without it, there
would certainly be a penalty for the notary, but a valid transaction would
have been made in default of the katoche.
Leaving aside these possible instances of malfunctioning, the epistalma
system itself, working to perfection, leaves many doors open to an effec-
tive sale despite a registered katoche. The system, first of all, seems to have
been compulsory only for immovables.32 If so, Isarous of P. Wisc. II 54
would have been able to sell the slave even through public deed despite
the recorded hypallagma.33 But even for immovables there was an obvious,
and for sure frequent, way out of the epistalma-requirement, simply by
selling without a notary, through a cheirographon. The use of cheirographa
was always possible, and fully valid. True, we know that in this case the
acquisition could not be registered in the bibliotheke. Furthermore, a mere
cheirographon was not enough to found an executive claim on immovable
property.34 Yet, both limitations could be overcome by a procedure of
ekmartyresis or demosiosis, designed to transform the private deed into a
public one. And, contrary to what we may expect, it seems that at least
THE BIBLIOTHEKE ENKTESEON 19
problems, the documents show, it must be admitted, the keen interest of the public
authorities in a proper functioning of the bibliotheke.
30 § 101 of the Gnomon: BGU V 1210 (2nd cent. ad, Alexandria) x, ll. 227–228: [§ãn tinew]
xrhmatiw [m]oË Ípoyhk«n ≥ »n«[n] s`u`n`ã`l`l`[agma grãcvnt]a`i1 x4v2r[‹w §]pistãlmatow,
katakr¤nontai (draxmåw) n.
31 P. Oxy II 237 viii, ll. 36–38: paragg°llv d¢ ka‹ to›w sunallagmatogãfoiw ka‹ to›w mnÆ-
mosi mhd¢n d¤xa §pistãlmatow toË bibliofulak[¤ou telei«sai, gnoËsin …w oÈk ˆfelow tÚ]
to`i1oËto éllå ka‹ aÈto‹ …w parå tå prostetagm°na poiÆsontew d¤khn ÍpomenoËsi tØn
prosÆ2kousan. On the question, von Woess, Urkundenwesen (cit. n. 26), pp. 220–222.
32 Wolff, Das Recht (cit. n. 17), pp. 224–225 and n. 14–16, with lit.
33 Precisely for this reason, P. Wisc. II 54 has been invoked as an argument that slaves
must also have been subject to the epistalma requirement. Sceptical, Wolff, Das Recht (cit.
n. 17), p. 255 n. 15 with lit.
34 Wolff, Das Recht (cit. n. 17), pp. 173–177.
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the demosiosis, carried out by the high office of the archidikastes in Alexan-
dria, did not involve the local bibliothekai. The Alexandrine synchoreseis
seem to have been equally out of the epistalma system, even when used by
the inhabitants of the chora for property that may have been registered in
the local bibliothekai under katoche.35
Furthermore, both for synchoreseis and for cheirographa after demosiosis
and ekmartyresis we have full evidence that the bibliotheke did not even
force a provisional registration, until receiving proof of the lack of obsta-
cles for a definitive one. The requests regarding synchoresis are P. Oxy. X
1268 (3rd cent. ad, Oxyrhynchos), P. Oxy. XXVII 2473 (ad 229, Oxyrhyn-
chos), SB VIII 9878 (ad 259, Oxyrhynchos), SB XVI 12345 [= P. Mil. Vogl.
IV 210] (ad 127/8, Tebtynis). For private documents after demosiosis we have
P. Oxy XII 1475 (ad 267, Oxyrhynchos), P. Coll. Yout. I 65 [= P. Oxy XLVII
3365] (ad 241, Oxyrhynchos), P. Coll. Yout. II 73 (ad 289, Panopolis). A reg-
istration request for a deed after ekmartyresis is preserved in P. Oxy IX 1199
(3rd cent. ad, Oxyrhynchos). None of these requests include a clause an -
nouncing a future apographe with full proof of ownership and freedom
from liens, nor a clause safeguarding the rights of previously registered
owners or creditors. In short, there is nothing provisional in them.36
35 von Woess, Urkundenwesen (cit. n. 26), pp. 181–182, and Wolff, Das Recht (cit. n. 17),
pp. 244–245 and n. 103. A conjecture to explain the exclusion of cheirographa, in Wolff,
Das Recht (cit. n. 17), p. 254. A detailed discussion of the exclusion of synchoreseis, in
G. Flore, ‘A proposito di P. Mil. Vogl. iv, 210’, Bullettino dell’Istituto di Diritto Romano 82
(1979), pp. 1–10.
36 This is not the prevailing opinion. Wolff, Das Recht (cit. n. 17), pp. 238–239, classifies
most of these requests as provisional paratheseis or as ‘Mischformen’: equally provisional
paratheseis that follow the model usually reserved for definitive registrations. The truth is
that, as underlined above, none of these requests show any of the elements that define
a provisional registration: the clause promising full proof of ownership and freedom from
liens on presenting the future apographe, and the clause safeguarding the rights of previ-
ously registered owners or creditors. The only reason behind Wolff ’s reticence to admit
that, in the absence of such clauses, these are definitive registrations, is the remark
‘pare(t°yh)’, added by the record official on top of some of them, and the final clause in
others, requesting parathesis to be performed (§pid¤dvmi tÚ ÍpÒmnhma prÚw tÚ tØn d°ousan
parãye1sin gen°syai, vel sim.). For Wolff, as for many others, the term parathesis has become
synonymous with provisional registration. This is not how it was understood by the offi-
cials behind these documents, as it clearly results from the numerous documents where:
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3. KATOCHE AND EPISTALMA
So far, we have only considered the gaps in the epistalma system, i.e., the
cases that fall out of the grasp of the bibliotheke. We have taken for  granted
that, for those within its grasp, the bibliophylakes would enforce the regis-
tered katoche and deny their cooperation, just as they are requested to act
in the hypallagmata of P. Wisc. II 54, P. Kron. 18 and P. Vars. 10 iii.37 A katoche
would lead the bibliotheke to refuse the authorisation (epistalma) required to
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a) all the clauses that mark a registration as provisional are lacking and yet a parathesis is
requested or the label pare(t°yh) is added; b) despite the pare(t°yh) or the parathesis
request, the document is introduced by the épogrãfomai distinctive of definitive regis-
trations. Cf., for the registration of a hypallagma: P. Lips. i 9 (ad 233, Hermopolis), l. 7:
épografÒmeya, l. 23: e[fiw tÚ] parãyesin gen°sy[ai]. For the registration of sales: P. Coll.
Youtie II 73 (ad 289, Panopolis), l. 3: épogrãfomai parÉ Ím›n; ll. 13–15: ka‹ éji«, énadoËsa
Ím›n §n §ktãktƒ tØn dhmos¤vsin, tØn d°ousan parãyesin t«i ÙnÒmat¤ mou gen°syai …w
kayÆkei; P. Vindob. Bosw. 3 (ad 277/8, Hermopolis), ll. 3–4: épogrãf[omai c. ?] parÉ Ím›n;
ll. 15–16: diÉ ˘ énaf°rv efi1w` [tÚ tØn d]°ousan parãyesin` parÉ Ím›n gen°syai; SB VI 9219
(ad 319, Hermopolis), l. 2: é`pogrãfomai; l. 6: ∂n ka‹ §pestalm°nhn Ím›n épÉ aÈtoË §nteËyen
én°dvka Ím›n [sÁn t“ prosfvn(Æsevw éntigr(ãfƒ), …]w` p2e1ri°xei, prÒw` <tÚ> [t]Øn d°ousa`n
parãyesin` p[arÉ] Ím›n gen°syai; P. Oxy X 1268 (3rd cent. ad, Oxyrhynchos), l. 1: pare(t°yh);
l. 4: épogrãfomai; SB VIII 9878 (ad 259, Oxyrhynchos), l. 1: pare(t°yh); l. 8: [épo]grãfo-
mai. These documents show that, at least in 3rd- and 4th-century Oxyrhynchos, Her-
mopolis and Panopolis, the antinomy apographe vs. parathesis was not referred to definitive
vs. provisional registrations: rather, as the quoted documents show, apographe was the pres-
entation of a document for (definitive) registration, and parathesis its (definitive or provi-
sional) registration by the bibliotheke. In this sense, taking SB VIII 9878 as a point of
departure, E. Kiessling, ‘Ein Beitrag zum Grundbuchrecht im Hellenistischen Ägypten’,
JJurP 15 (1965), pp. 73–90, especially p. 76: ‘Im Hinblick auf den allgemeinen Gebrauch
des Wortes ist es daher irreführend, wenn man daneben die parãyesiw als feststehenden
Terminus für die provisorische Buchung einer Vormerkung herausstellt’, and p. 81: ‘Als
épografÆ bezeichnet man im Grundbuchrecht jede pflichtgemäße, schriftliche Meldung
an das Grundbuchamt, welche eine Buchung (parãyesiw) in den Grundbuchblättern (dia-
str≈mata) zum Ziele hat.’ Cf. also already Mitteis, Grundzüge (cit. n. 12), pp. 101, with
Kiessling’s remark (p. 81 and n. 33–34), and von Woess, Urkundenwesen (cit. n. 26), pp.
204–206, 251–260. More lit. in Wolff, Das Recht (cit. n. 17), p. 299 n. 80 i.f.
37 Cf. also P. Lond. III 1157 (p. 111) (= MChr. 199, ad 146, Hermopolis), where an unsecured
creditor addresses the bibliophylakes in fear that his debtor may alienate some property
before he gets his cheirographon through demosiosis in Alexandria: the creditor seems to take
for granted that a registered katoche would block any sale attempt.
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sell or mortgage by public deed. And yet, there is in the scholarship a com-
mon belief that this was not necessarily so. The bibliophylakes would rather
merely deny the buyer a definitive registration, usually called apographe,
forcing him to a provisional one, usually called parathesis, explicitly
acknowledging the primacy of the creditor’s right over his own.38
Thus, in his detailed, careful chapter on the bibliotheke enkteseon, Hans
Julius Wolff admits, together with the denial of epistalma, the possibility of
its concession with restrictions. The epistalma was denied, he writes, or at
least subject to a restriction, explicitly safeguarding the rights of a third
person, when such rights were known to the bibliotheke and impeded the
alienation or in any case could be enforced against a buyer.39 In this sense,
Wolff argues, must be understood the part of the Edict of Mettius Rufus
referred to the liens of wives and children on the property of their hus-
bands and parents. And, in fact, in the words of the praefect, the aim of the
registration of such rights seems to be to make them public, so that the
potential buyers may not defrauded by their ignorance (·na ofl sunallãs-
sontew mØ katÉ ê`g4n`o`ian §nedreÊvntai), but not at all to block the sale itself.
The idea has a long tradition. It had been first suggested by Ernst
Rabel in 1909, in his ground-breaking study on the inalienability of the
pledge.40 After reviewing the (at that point scarce) documentary evidence
for the registration of real securities, Rabel cautiously favours the
hypothesis that a katoche securing a debt of private law would not prevent
the sale and even its registration through provisional parathesis, but only
an unconditioned registration, that is, one without explicit safeguard of
the previously registered right of the creditor.41 Rabel invokes BGU I 243
(= MChr. 216, ad 186, Arsinoites), where a buyer requests provisional
parathesis, and his request concludes precisely with a clause safeguarding
38 Parathesis appears in our documents for any registration performed by the bibliotheke: of
a katoche or of property, provisional or definitive. Apographe instead refers to the act of pre-
senting a title deed for a definitive registration of property. On the question, supra, n. 36.
39 Wolff, Das Recht (cit. n. 17), p. 248.
40 Cf. in the same year, but as a mere theoretical possibility, O. Eger, Zum ägyptischen
Grundbuchwesen in römischer Zeit, Leipzig – Berlin 1909, p. 86.
41 Rabel, Verfügungsbeschränkungen (cit. n. 1), p. 65.
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the rights of previously registered owners or creditors who may hold a
katoche: efi d¢ fane¤h e‰nai kÊrion t[Ú] prokatesxh(m°non) µ propara -
ke¤(menon) diå toË bibl(iofulake¤ou) kvl(Êein) prÚ t∞w paray°sevw ka‹ mØ
t`“ ¶sesyai §mpÒdion §k t[∞s]de t∞w paray(°sevw) (ll. 13–16).
Together with this text, Rabel mentions other similar parathesis
requests explicitly safeguarding the rights of possible previously regis-
tered owners or creditors: P. Chic. I 2, P. Gen. I 44, the by then still unpub-
lished P. Hamb. I 16, and P. Tebt. II 318. This evidence, together with the
similar documents edited after Rabel, will be discussed infra, in section 4.
Rabel’s idea was immediately adopted by Mitteis in the Grundzüge:42
As it has often been conjectured, and P. Hamb. 14 and 15 prove, a definitive
transmission and apographe require that the property be free from real
securities; in other words, a real security carries with itself a prohibition
of (definitive) alienation. It seemed, however, undesirable to unduly bind
the hands of the owner, and hence a transmission was allowed with the
provisional effect that the right of the buyer would be registered at least
by parathesis.43
For Mitteis this situation is a likely explanation for the unregistered
(mØ épogegramm°now) seller that we find in some parathesis requests.44 It is
not that the seller was not registered at all, for in that case the public
deed necessary for the parathesis-request would be impossible to obtain by
lack of epistalma.45 Rather, the seller himself would be, possibly due to
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42 Even before, cf. P. M. Meyer, Griechische Papyrusurkunden der Hamburger Staats- und Uni-
versitätsbibliothek I, 1, Leipzig – Berlin 1911, p. 56, in the introduction to P. Hamb. I 14, and p. 61
s., in the introduction to P. Hamb. I 15. On these important documents, more infra, sub v.
43 Mitteis, Gründzuge (cit. n. 12), p. 104. The same assumption, that a registered real
security does not exclude the sale but merely its definitive registration by apographe, in
L. Mitteis, ‘Neue Urkunden’, ZRG RA 33 (1912) 641, for P. Oxy IX 1199. In this parathesis
request there is not the slightest hint of provisionality, though: merely the term parathesis
and Mitteis’ assumption that it implies provisionality: on this, supra, n. 36.
44 In his time, BGU I 243, l. 9, P. Hamb. I 16, l. 14. Edited later, P. Graux II 18 (= 19), l. 11,
P. Mich. XII 627, l. 11.
45 In such cases, possibly the only way to a registration would be a private deed followed
by demosiosis or ekmartyresis.
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a previous katoche, provisionally registered by mere parathesis, as we know
it was the case in P. Gen. I 44.46 It further follows, as it is today generally
accepted,47 that a sale authorised by the bibliotheke was possible not only
for the owner who had presented full apographe, but also for the owner
with a mere provisional parathesis.
After Mitteis, the idea seems to have become established as part of
our common stock, both in reference books such as Weiss’48 and Tauben-
schlag’s,49 and in monographic studies, like those by von Woeß50 and
Flore.51 Its importance is difficult to overestimate, and yet it has not been,
46 P. Gen. I 44 (= MChr. 215), ll. 16–18: diakaim°n[ou k]atå parãyas[i]n diå soË §p‹ [toË
` ` ` ` ` ` ` ¶touw] m2hnÚw Fa«f4i §`p2É [Ùn]Òmatow toË Ípoxeir¤ou [aÈt“ ˆntow AÈrhl(¤ou)] Log -
geinç toË ka‹ ÉAmmvn¤ou éfÆlikow.
47 Wolff, Das Recht (cit. n. 17), p. 248 sub a.
48 E. Weiss, Griechisches Privatrecht I, Leipzig 1923, 271 s. and n. 92: ‘Daneben stehen
jene Fälle, wo der Eintrag vorbehaltlich bücherlich älterer vom Gesuchssteller zu ent-
kräftender Rechte Dritter erfolgte; dazu kann es zunächst dann kommen, wenn der Ver-
äußerer durch ein, ein Veräußerungsverbot darstellendes Pfandrecht an der Übertragung
zu vollem Rechte gehindert war. Man spricht dann von parãyesiw, nicht von épografÆ,
und will der nunmehrige Erwerber, ohne das Pfandrecht gelöscht zu haben, weiter ver-
äußern, so liegt nach der Ausdrucksweise der Quellen Erwerb von einem mØ époge-
gramm°now vor.’
49 R. Taubenschlag, The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the Light of the Papyri, Warsaw
1955, p. 228: ‘Sometimes §p¤stalma was granted even if the examination of the title had
revealed that there was a positive obstacle, a katoxÆ. In such a case this grant was made
without prejudice regarding the katoxÆ, which in reality prevented the closing of the
transaction and thus resulted again in parãyesiw’.
50 Von Woess, Urkundenwesen (cit. n. 26), p. 197: ‘Übrigens wurde gelegentlich auch eine
etwas weniger strenge Praxis gehandhabt. Man gab das §p¤stalma, wie schon früher ange-
deutet wurde, trotz der katoxÆ hinaus, machte aber einen Vorbehalt zugunsten des durch
die katoxÆ gewahrten Rechtes, der vom Notar in die Urkunde hineingenommen wurde
und diese natürlich entwertete. Diesen Vorgang scheint zB. das §p¤stalma-Gesuch Stud.
Pal. 20 nr. 12 im Auge zu haben.’ On this document that von Woess brings into the dis-
cussion as his main source, cf. infra, sub. v.
51 G. Flore, ‘Sulla biblioyÆkh t«n §gktÆsevn’, Aegyptus 8 (1927), pp. 56–58; 60–62,
68–70, cf. especially p. 61: ‘Sino a qual punto questo complicato sistema di garanzie impe-
disse la emanazione di un §p¤stalma, non è chiaro; si sostiene però, generalmente, che
perfino la presenza di una sola di esse fermasse la trasmissione di un fondo. Non lo credo:
troppe deviazioni ci mostrano che, nonostante le katoxa¤, i fondi si vendevano’, and n. 1,
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in my opinion, fully acknowledged, despite the theory itself remaining
unchallenged. If the theory held true, it would mean that the non-alien-
ation principle was virtually abandoned, in one of the deepest changes in
the history of the Greek real securities. The katoche arising from the secu-
rity would have been transformed, from a rigid hold that blocked the
alienation into a guarantee for the creditor that his registered right would
prevail over the provisional registration of the buyer. The solution would
come remarkably close to the Roman one. The debtor would be free to
sell, as the Roman one was, and, as in the Roman system, it would be
ensured that the creditor’s right would prevail over the new owner’s. Only
the means that would assure the creditor’s prevalence differ. The Roman
system extended the claim erga omnes typical of owners to a non-owner
like the creditor, making him thus prevail even over a new owner in good
faith. In this parathesis-system, instead a definitive registration is denied
to the buyer, who will only obtain a provisional one explicitly acknowl-
edging the creditor’s right as prevailing over his own.
The following paragraphs will be devoted to reviewing the evidence, in
order to assess how much of the theory may be actually proven by the
available sources. The crucial questions are the following:
a) The first concerns the safeguard clause reproduced above. Prima
facie, it could seem that it merely shows that the bibliotheke accepted pro-
visional registrations despite the possibility of a katoche. Is this all its
value, or does it allow to conclude that the bibliotheke would register (and
hence also previously authorise) a sale despite the certainty of a recorded
katoche? This question will be addressed in section 4.
b) The second question refers to the remaining evidence. Is there any
documentary evidence beyond the safeguard clause? In particular: do we
have evidence of an actual sale being authorised despite a real security?
The relevant documents will be presented in sections 5, 6, and 7.
c) Most of the sales of a pledged object are made, in any legal system
that permits them, with immediate cancellation of the pledge. The buyer,
unless deceitfully kept unaware of the pledge, will usually make sure that
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where he quotes as evidence P. Gen. I 44, P. Hamb. I 16 and Stud. Pal. XX 12, on which cf.
infra, in sections 5 and 6.
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the secured debt is paid for.52 The best way to proceed is to pay the price,
up to the amount of the debt, directly to the the creditor, rather than
trusting the seller.53 It will therefore be of no surprise, if most of the evi-
dence we find refers to sales whose price is destined to satisfy the secured
debt. But any indication of an interest of the record office in this cir-
cumstance has a very different value. It raises the suspicion that not every
sale was allowed, but merely those aimed at cancelling debt and security
with the price. Was that the case? The question will be considered
throughout sections 5, 6, and 7.
4. THE SAFEGUARD CLAUSE 
IN THE PROVISIONAL PARATHESIS REQUESTS
Rabel’s main argument came, as we have seen, from BGU I 243 and the
other provisional parathesis-requests known in 1909: P. Chic. I 2, P. Gen. I
44,54 and P. Hamb. I 16 (still unpublished at the time), as well as P. Tebt. II
318 (referred not to a sale but to a non-alienation agreement). Rabel high-
52 In Graeco-Egyptian law, this was especially crucial when buying a hypothecated object,
because the hypothecarian creditor, unlike the hypallagmatic one, had no claim against the
debtor but merely on the hypothecated object itself. For this difference between hypothec
and hypallagma, cf. Alonso, ‘Alpha and Omega’ (cit. n. 9), pp. 24-26 and n. 21.
53 Notorious cases where a debt is cancelled by the buyer of the hypothecated object are
mentioned by Meyer, P. Hamb. I (cit. n. 42), p. 55 n. 5. In BGU II 362 (ad 215, Arsinoites)
ix, ll. 15–24, from the accounts of the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus in Arsinoe, we learn
of a certain Olympia, who apparently had received from the temple, on the hypothec of
a house, a loan that she now repays through the purchasers of the house. And in P. Oxy III
486 = MChr. 59 (ad 131, Oxyrhynchos), ll. 22–26, Dionysia addresses the praefect Flavius
Titianus to defend herself against the accusations of a certain Sarapion, concerning some
property that she claims to have bought, paying the price to the father of Sarapion and to
some creditors of the father, who had a hypothec over the property. Naturally, taking into
account the context of both documents, there is in them no mention of the bibliotheke. Cf.
further P. Hamb. I 14 (ad 209/10, Arsinoites), infra, in section 5, and P. Hamb. I 15 and 16
(both ad 209, Arsinoites) infra, in section 6.
54 P. Gen. I 44, BGU I 243 and P. Chic. I 2 (quoted by Rabel as Class. Phil. 2) were re- edited
by Mitteis in the Chrestomathie as nos. 215, 216 and 217.
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lighted these texts not because he conjectured that in these specific cases
a creditor’s right was the obstacle for a full apographe but rather because
of a clause that appears towards the end of all of them. It reads:
efi d¢ fane¤h (fane¤hsan, fane›en) •t°rƒ pros∞kon (prosÆkonta, prosÆkou-
sai) µ prokatesxhm°non (prokatesxhm°na, prokatesxhm°nai) (diå toË bib-
liofulake¤ou), mØ ¶sesyai §mpÒdion §k t∞sde t∞w paray°sevw.55
Since Rabel, the clause has reappeared in identical fashion in every
parathesis-request that presents itself as provisional, that is, foreseeing a fu -
ture apographe.56 We can therefore be sure that it was imposed by the
record-office for such registrations. I will refer to it as ‘safeguard clause’,
for, despite some dissenting opinions, it clearly aims at safeguarding previ-
ously registered rights.57 Such rights are described by two alternative terms:
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55 P. Chic. I 2 (= MChr. 217, 2nd. cent. ad, Arsinoites), ll. 9–11; P. Gen. I 44 (ad 259, Arsi-
noites), ll. 22–24; P. Hamb. I 16 (ad 226, Arsinoites), ll. 21–23. I shall leave aside P. Tebt. II
318 (= MChr. 218, ad 166, Tebtynis), where the clause appears in identical fashion
(ll. 22–24), but the registration refers to a non-alienation agreement securing a credit, not
to a sale. In BGU I 243 (ad 186, Arsinoites), the clause reads somewhat differently
(ll. 13–16): efi d¢ fane¤h efinai kÊrion t[Ú] prokatesxh(m°non) diå toË bibl(iofulake¤ou)
kvl(Êein) prÚ t∞w paray°sevw ka‹ mØ t“ ¶sesyai §mpodion §k t[∞s]de t∞w paray(°sevw).
56 SB VI 9625 (ad 177–192, Tebtynis), ll. 21–24; BGU XI 2031 (ad 180–192, Karanis), ll.
24–26; SB XIV 11399 (2nd cent. ad, Theadelphia), l. 15–17; P. Diog. 20 (ad 226, Arsinoites),
ll. 5–6; P. Mich. XII 627 (ad 298, Philadelphia), ll. 15–17; PSI X 1126 (3rd cent. ad, Arsi-
noites), ll. 22–23; PSI X 1127 (3rd cent. ad, Arsinoites), ll. 15–17; P. Graux II 18 (= 19, ad 307,
Philadelphia), ll. 13–14; P. Alex. inv. nr. 266 (date and provenance unknown), ll. 7–8.
57 Eger, Grundbuchwesen (cit. n. 40), p. 135, understands the clause inversely, as a safe-
guard for the petitioner against someone else’s future parathesis: ‘eine frühere parãyesiw
geht einer späteren vor’. Similarly, E. Kiessling, ‘Die Vormerkung im ägyptischen
Grundbuchrecht’, ZRG RA 82 (1965), p. 313 and idem, ‘Grundbuchrecht’ (cit. n. 36), 
pp. 88–89, refers §k t∞sde t∞w paray°sevw to a possible future parathesis in favour of some-
one else, from which no obstacle should arise for the present petitioner. Against such
interpretations, it must be observed that: a) §k t∞sde t∞w paray°sevw can only refer to the
present parathesis, not to a future one; b) there can be no legal value for a unilateral decla-
ration whereby I decree the superiority of my own position against others: it is in my hand
to yield to someone else’s right, but certainly not to decree that he yield before mine.
Against Kiessling, cf. Wolff, Das Recht (cit. n. 17), p. 243 and n. 95.
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pros∞kon µ prokatesxhm°non (diå toË bibliofulake¤ou). The former points
to possible previously registered owners, the latter to previously registered
creditors who may hold a katoche on the asset.58 In these terms, imposed by
the record office, the buyer is thus forced to acknowledge the pre-emi-
nence of such previously registered owners and creditors.59
This safeguard clause is crucial for Rabel’s conclusions on the impact
of the bibliotheke enkteseon on real securities and on the limitations they
imposed on the debtor’s faculty to alienate.60 Contrary to what one may
have expected, the bibliotheke seems not to have helped to enforce inalien-
ability. Quite the opposite: the katoche-part of the safeguard clause shows
– Rabel argues – that a real security, even registered as katoche, would not
prevent the registration of a buyer or newly secured creditor. A provi-
sional parathesis would be granted all the same; only a definitive, uncondi-
tional registration would be excluded (that is, an apographe with no safe-
guard of the previously registered katoche).
58 Similarly, in the less fortunate version of BGU I 243 (supra, n. 55), we find the alternative
prokatesxh(m°non) µ proparake¤(menon), where the second term must be referred to a pre-
viously registered owner, the first again to a katoche. This version is translated by F. Prei-
sigke, WB, s.v. proparãkeimai, thus: ‘Sollte es sich ergeben, daß vor dieser meiner Besitz-
hinterlegung eine vorausgegangene Sperre oder Hinterlegung derselben Besitzes zu Recht
besteht, dann soll ihr auch aus dieser meiner Hinterlegung kein Nachteil erwachsen’.
59 Von Woess, Urkundenwesen (cit. n. 26), p. 208, understands the clause in a very dif-
ferent way: ‘Die parãyesiw soll kein Hindernis sein, für die §p¤stalma-Erteilung nämlich,
soferne der in Wahrheit bücherlich Legitimierte darum einkommt’. For von Woeß, the
petitioner does not acknowledge the primacy of previously registered rights over his own.
He merely admits the right of those previously registered to obtain an epistalma that his
parathesis should  – so von Woeß – have blocked. Against such interpretation we may put
forward that: a) it is not likely that a parathesis registered to the name of a buyer Y (or to
the name of the seller X, since it has been argued that provisional paratheseis were mar-
ginal annotations in the folium of the seller: cf. Wolff, Das Recht [cit. n. 17], pp. 244–245)
can lead the bibliophylakes to refuse epistalma to a fully apographed Z, whose right is free
from the uncertainties that prevented Y’s apographe, and in whose folium there is no trace
of the conflicting parathesis, which would thus very likely remain unnoticed for the biblio-
phylakes; b) von Woeß’ reading works relatively well in reference to a previously registered
owner, who may wish to sell or encumber his property. Yet, the clause wants the petitioner
to yield also to previously registered holders of a katoche. And for these, von Woeß’ inter-
pretation makes absolutely no sense.
60 Rabel, Verfügungsbeschränkungen (cit. n. 1), p. 65.
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Prima facie, it may seem that the clause does not prove quite so much
as Rabel would wish. It certainly shows that the bibliophylakes would reg-
ister a sale despite the possibility of conflicting previously registered
rights.61 It may instead not seem enough to prove beyond doubt that they
would equally register the sale despite the certainty of a katoche recorded
to the name of the seller. This scepticism may not be wholly justified, for
the following reasons.
Provisional parathesis-requests contain, together with our clause, also
another one foreseeing a future full apographe, when the buyer shall prove
that the object belongs to him and is free (ıpÒtan går tØn épografØn
poi«mai, épode¤jv …w Ípãrxei ka‹ ¶sti kayarÒn). It is precisely such
clause that justifies labelling these paratheseis as ‘provisional’. We do not
know what the disadvantages of a provisional parathesis, as compared to a
full apographe, were (if any), other than the explicit safeguard of previous-
ly registered rights. But it seems clear that the easiest situation for the
buyer is to be entitled to a direct apographe. In the documented cases it is
not always possible to ascertain why such full apographe was unfeasible.
For some of them, the evidence seems to point directly to a katoche: these
will be our main sources, infra, sub 5, 6, and 7. In others the reason has
been found in the mention of the seller as not fully registered himself (mØ
épogegramm°now). But this second reason usually points to something
else: if there were no obstacle for a full apographe, the seller could just reg-
ister the property on the very same day of the sale, as it often was the
case,62 making thus a full apographe possible also for the buyer. On the
other hand, a mØ épogegramm°now cannot simply be someone not regis-
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61 It might be argued that it does not prove even this, since we do not have decisions but
only requests. Yet, these are not freely formulated by the petitioners: the perfectly con-
stant formulation shows that the model was, as always, imposed by the record office, and
within it also our clause, that never fails to appear.
62 Among the many documented cases where the registration is only made in order to
sell, P. Wisc. II 54 (ad 116, Ptolemais Euergetis), P. Tebt. II 472 (ad  120/1, Tebtynis); P. Hamb.
I 62 (= P. Fam. Tebt. 23, ad 123, Tebtynis); P. Tebt. II 323 (= MChr. 208, ad 127, Tebtynis);
P. Lond. II 299 (p. 150) (= MChr. 204, ad 128, Ptolemais Euergetis); Stud. Pal. XXII 85
(ad 128, Alabanthis); P. Bon. 24b (ad 135, Tebtynis); P. Hamb. I 16 (ad 209, Arsinoites);
P. Mich. IX 542 (3rd cent. ad, Karanis). Cf. A. M. Harmon, ‘Egyptian property returns’,
Yale Classical Studies 4 (1934), pp. 213, 221.
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tered: a not registered seller could not have obtained the epistalma
required for the sale contract to be a public deed.63 Leaving aside the
cases of demosiosis and ekmartyresis, the mØ épogegramm°now must there-
fore have obtained a provisional parathesis himself, on the basis of which
he was later granted the sale-epistalma. Hence, again, someone for whom
a full apographe had been for some reason excluded. 
In short: the seller’s lack of apographe, that the scholarship tends to
favour as explanation for our provisional parathesis requests,64 is usually
not a full explanation. Behind it, there tends to be a seller for whom only
parathesis, not apographe, had been possible. Why, the documents do not
say, but the best candidate to be the obstacle is a katoche. A katoche may
have arisen from a registered real security, a hypothec or a hypallagma.65
It may also have arisen from the registration of a simple, unsecured
 credit, as our evidence shows.66 Another source thereof may be the rights
of wives and children mentioned in the Edict of Mettius Rufus, or, as
mentioned in the Edict of Tiberius Alexander, the protopraxia of the fiscus
against those assuming liturgies or that of the wives securing the restitu-
tion of their dowries.
True, the difficulties of the seller may not be connected to a katoche: 
he may simply have not sufficient proof of his right. For this possibility,
the clause included the reference to a possible previously registered owner.
But together with it, it also included our reference to a previously regis-
tered katoche, showing that also this was foreseen as a parathesis case.
It could still be argued that the clause is sufficiently explained by the pos-
sibility of such katoche: that it does not postulate the certainty of it. But
a possible katoche means here an undetected one, and the clause simply can-
63 The preserved parathesis requests often explicitly underline that the document is a pub -
lic deed; in any case, the registration of a private deed was possible only after demosiosis or
ekmartyresis: supra, section 2 and n. 34.
64 Cf. Wolff, Das Recht (cit. n. 17), p. 240.
65 In this case, one must conjecture a real security contracted not by the seller himself,
but by the previous owner: since the security prevented the seller’s full apographe, it must
have existed already when he acquired.
66 P. Lond. III 1157 (p. 111) (= MChr. 199, ad 146, Hermopolis), supra, n. 37. Cf. also P. Hamb.
I 14 (ad 209/10, Arsinoites), infra, section 5 and n. 77.
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not refer to them. Admittedly, it is not unconceivable that something goes
undetected in the registration process. When authorising the sale, the pres-
ence of a previously registered right, inscribed to the name of someone else
than the seller, could for instance easily escape the attention of the record
office. The same could happen with unregistered katochai, as the Edict of
Mettius Rufus underlined, when warning that the liens of wives and children
should be registered ‘in order that those who make agreements with them
may not be defrauded through ignorance’ (P. Oxy. II 237 viii, ll. 34–36). Our
clause refers, however, only to recorded katochai (prokatesxhm°non diå toË
bibliofulake¤ou).67 And, as we well know, katochai as such are not registered
in the folium of the beneficiary, but in the folium of the encumbered owner.68
By definition, therefore, they can hardly go undetected. Hence: it is not to
undetected ones that the clause refers.69
Concluding: the safeguard clause proves that a provisional parathesis
was feasible not merely despite the possibility of a previously registered
katoche, but despite the certainty of it. And, if such a possibility was fore-
seen by the bibliotheke, it must have been because in such case the biblio-
theke itself did not necessarily deny authorisation (epistalma) to the seller.70
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67 From thirteen occurrences of the clause, diå toË bibliofulake¤ou is left out in three:
BGU xi 2031 (180–192, Karanis), P. Chic. 2 (= MChr. 217, ad 217, Arsinoites), SB XIV 11399
(2nd cent. ad, Theadelphia). There is no geographical or chronological pattern, nor is any
different effect conjecturable. The best hypothesis seems to be that these three docu-
ments simply present a somewhat shorter version implying what has been left out.
68 Cf. Wolff, Das Recht (cit. n. 17), pp. 235–238, especially n. 67. Securities, like hypothec,
that do not consist in a mere katoche but are conceived as suspended ownership, are for
that very reason recorded not only, qua katochai, in the folium of the debtor, but also, qua
rights, in that of the creditor.
69 Unless, with von Woess, Urkundenwesen (cit. n. 26), pp. 213–214, we imagine the occa-
sionally chaotic conditions of the bibliothekai (supra, n. 29) as the reason behind the clause.
This hypothesis, however, does not hold. The mere fact that the clause figures only in pro-
visional registrations, and not in apographai, too (where a mistake due to disorder is  equally
possible and certainly more harmful) is enough to realise that the clause is not related to
transient difficulties, but to the difference itself between provisional and definitive regis-
trations.
70 Unless the clause had been introduced exclusively for the hypothesis of synchoreseis and
cheirographa after demosiosis, that arrived to registration without previous epistalma. The
hypothesis does not seem very likely.
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A full proof of this latter assumption requires documentary evidence of
sales being authorised or registered despite a katoche. The following sec-
tions are devoted to documents that may provide such evidence.
5. NOTIFICATION OF SALE (ΕΞΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΗΣΙΣ) 
A REAL SECURITY NOTWITHSTANDING?
Our first document, Stud. Pal. XX 12 (= SB I 5835, 2nd cent. ad, Arsi-
noites) was presented as evidence by von Woeß.71 It was the main proof
for him that the bibliotheke would grant epistalma despite a katoche, with
safeguard of the katoche itself. A certain Artemis, priestess of Osiris, Isis
and Harpokrates, notifies the bibliophylakes of the Arsinoites her wish to
sell a house with atrium, registered by parathesis, to a certain Helena for
2200 drachms. The last six lines before the subscription (ll. 19–24) run as
follows:
prvtopra-
20 j¤aw oÎshw Ma`r1 `[c. ?] éf3Ælik`i1
prÚw tØn oÔsan t[∞]w ÉA2r1t[°]meitow
ka[t]oxØn [•]lom[°]new ÑArp2o`kra`t2¤vna
Kro[n¤]v[now] t[oË k]a‹ ÑArp2[okrat¤v]now
24 fler°a [efi]w tØn toË éfÆlikow §pitro(pÆn).
The clause safeguards the protopraxia of a certain Mar(ion?),72 a minor
(éf∞lij). The protopraxia is said to exist ‘in reference to an existing
katoche on Artemis’, or maybe ‘in reference to the existing property of
Artemis’.73 The final mention of the guardianship may only be under-
stood, if somehow connected to the protopraxia. In fact, in the most
71 Von Woess, Urkundenwesen (cit. n. 26), pp. 197, 214 s.
72 So von Woess, Urkundenwesen (cit. n. 26), p. 197: Mar¤vn is also the name of Artemis’
husband (l. 9)
73 For katoche as ‘possessions’, cf. Preisigke, WB, s.h.v., 4: ‘Innehaben eines Besitzes,
Besitz’.
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likely interpretation of the last three lines, the minor had protopraxia
over Artemis’ property because she had been responsible for the choice
of his tutor.74
Several reasons advise to leave aside this text, despite the importance
that von Woeß assigns to it. First of all, the fact that Artemis merely noti -
fies her intention to sell, but does not request authorisation (epistalma)
has been interpreted as a clear signal that epistalma would not be granted
in this case.75 Secondly, a registered katoche is here probable but not com-
pletely sure: the term may in this case mean ‘property’ and not ‘hold’, and
the minor’s protopraxia could well not have been, or not yet, registered.
And, last but not least, even if there were a registered katoche, it would
not be one arising from a real security, but from the protopraxia in favour
of the minor, somehow connected to his guardianship. The case falls thus
out of our scope.
Fortunately, we do not need it as indirect evidence either. Another
document has survived, where the same type of notification is presented
by someone who wishes to sell a hypothecated item: P. Hamb. I 14 
(ad 209/10, Arsinoites). A certain Herais addresses the bibliophylakes of
the Arsinoites notifying her wish to sell (b[o]Ê`lomai §joik[onom∞]sai, l. 15)
to a certain Sarapion two thirds of a house she has registered by apographe
(l. 7). She furthermore declares that, from a price of 2000 drachms, only
200 are for herself: the remaining 1800 shall be paid by the buyer to a cer-
tain Serenus (l. 18–22) who had lent her 1500 under hypothec and yet 300
more without a collateral (l. 9–15).76 That the hypothec (and perhaps the
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74 The tutor, a priest named Harpokration, son of Kronion, also called Harpokration, is
very likely Artemis’ brother in law, i.e., the brother of her husband, also himself a priest:
Marion, son of Kronion also called Harpokration (ll. 9–11).
75 A. B. Schwarz, ‘Prosaggel¤a und ¢p¤stalma’, ZRG RA 41 (1920), pp. 273–278; P. M.
Meyer, ‘Papyrusbericht’, Zeitschrift für vergleichende Recthswissenschaft 40 (1923) 210. Con-
tra, von Woess, Urkundenwesen (cit. n. 26), pp. 179–180, 198 and n. 1. On the whole ques-
tion, cf. infra, in this section and nn. 79–81.
76 The interest for these loans, the usual 1% per month, will thus not be cancelled:
whether it had been previously paid for or it would be in the future in some other way,
the document does not allow to conjecture. Cf. Meyer, P. Hamb. I (cit. n. 42), p. 59, 
sub 22.
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unsecured credit, too)77 was registered seems almost sure, despite the
small reconstructed gap, from l. 9–10: ¯n §n ÍpoyÆk˙ [diÉ Í]m«n.78
There was therefore a hypothecarian katoche, and in spite of it, a sale is
taking place. What is more, it is not hidden from the bibliophylakes. On the
contrary, it is notified to them, calling their attention precisely to the
hypothec that should have blocked it. The purpose behind this notification
has been the object of much discussion. Usually, such notifications conclude
with a request to the bibliophylakes to authorise the sale, i.e. to give epistalma.
But, as in Stud. Pal. XX 12, this key element of the so-called prosangeliai is
missing here. For Meyer, in his edition of the papyrus, there is no question
of considering such request implicit. In his opinion, an epistalma was neither
requested, nor expected, and it would have not been granted either.79 Since
the seller was fully registered, the reason for such exclusion is, for Meyer, the
katoche: an epistalma would be feasible only after the cancellation of the
katoche by the bibliophylakes, at the creditor’s request.80
77 For the registration of unsecured credits to prevent alienations -hence as katochai-, cf.
the well known example of P. Lond. III 1157 (p. 111) (= MChr. 199, ad 146, Hermopolis):
supra, n. 37.
78 According to Meyer, P. Hamb. I, p. 57 ad 9 s., the following word, despite the four first
letters, cannot be the expected parat`e`[ye¤]s2˙.
79 Surprisingly, von Woess, who, as we have seen, takes the epistalma for granted in Stud.
Pal. XX 12, believes that in P. Hamb. I 14 it would have been denied, although in his opinion
it is equally implicitly requested. He argues that in this case there is an unpaid debt blocking
the sale. This reason, even if it may seem prima facie sensible, would lead to a completely dif-
ferent treatment of katochai depending on whether they assure an actual debt or only a poten-
tial liability or right (like those of wives and children in the Edict of Mettius Rufus and those
from liturgies and securing the restitution of the dowry in the Edict of Tiberius Alexander).
And for such difference there is not the slightest hint in the sources. Quite the opposite: cf.
for the katoche of the wife, the prohibition to sell dictated by the archidikastes in the famous
Drusilla process, in P. Cattaoui verso col. i (= MChr. 88, before ad 87, Alexandria) ll. 13–35; for
the katoche of the children, cf. the argued invalidity of a sale without their consent, in CPR I
19 (= Stud. Pal. XX 86 = MChr. 69, ad 330, Hermopolis), ll. 18–19; for that of the wife, cf. P. Oxy
II 237 (after ad 186, Oxyrhynchos) vi, ll. 2–3, in the famous case of Dionysia.
80 An example of a request to the bibliophylakes for the cancellation of a hypothec, in
BGU III 907 (ad 180–192, Arsinoites). Cf. also P. Lond. II 348 (p. 214 = MChr. 197, ad 202/3,
Ptolemais Evergetis), a receipt whereby a debtor is released, and the creditor promises
such record-office cancellation of the hypothec.
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This conjecture, though, creates a problem. If the epistalma was ex -
cluded, what was the purpose of the notification? Schwarz suggested, for
all these notifications without epistalma request,81 an effect in favour of the
presumptive buyer similar to the one that Mitteis had already conjectured
for the epistalma. It would prevent a second authorised sale to a different
buyer. Mitteis had, in fact, assumed that obtaining an epistalma would
block the possibility to be granted a second one, unless the former is can-
celled. In Mitteis’ conjecture, the epistalma concession would leave some
trace in the diastromata, a sort of ‘pre-notation’ (‘Vormerkung’) in favour of
the buyer, with an effect for the seller similar to that of a katoche.
Mitteis himself underlines, though, that this is just a conjecture, backed
by no documentary evidence, even if compatible with the surviving docu-
ments, particularly with the mention of the buyer in the so-called prosan-
geliai. The conjecture is understandable in the context of Mitteis’ Grund-
buch-theory. The principle of publica fides postulated by this theory does not
seem compatible with two sale deeds in favour of different  buyers that are
both recordable due to two contradictory epistalmata. Yet without docu-
mentary support and after the fall of the Grundbuch-theory, conclusively
proven wrong by von Woess, there is no reason to keep the hypothesis.
As far as P. Hamb. I 14 is concerned, there is a further reason to reject
it. In her notification to the bibliophylakes, Herais underlines that the aim
of the sale is the cancellation of the hypothec (ll. 18–21). This would not
make much sense if the notification served merely to protect the buyer.
It becomes instead understandable if its purpose is to obtain the biblio-
phylakes’ authorisation to sell.
The importance that the document assigns to this purpose of debt
cancelling also re-dimensions its value as evidence. The document does
not refer to just any sale, but to one aimed at cancelling the hypothec. It
therefore serves as evidence only for such sales, and could even lead to
suspect that it was only in such cases that the sale was authorised.
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81 Schwarz, ‘!ροσαγγε()α’ (cit. n. 75), on the basis of Mitteis, Grundzüge (cit. n. 12), 
pp. 98–99. Together with the already mentioned Stud. Pal. XX 12 and P. Hamb. I 14, we
have three further examples: BGU XI 2092 (ad 140, Arsinoites), SB VI 9069 (3rd cent. ad,
Arsinoites), and, not for sale but for hypothecation, PSI IV 314 (ad 195, Arsinoites).
011_054 alonso 2010:011_041 Ch1  1/10/12  11:35 PM  Page 35
JOSÉ LUIS ALONSO 36
6. EPISTALMA FOR A SALE 
AIMED AT CANCELLING A REAL SECURITY?
Yet another case of this sort was conjectured by Meyer behind the two
papyri that immediately follow this one in his edition: P. Hamb. I 15 and
16 (both ad 209, Arsinoites). P. Hamb. I 16 is a parathesis request  presented
by Antonia Thermutarion82 regarding a share of a house that she has
bought from four siblings, who had inherited it from their father but had
not yet registered it to their own name by apographe (ll. 13–14: mØ époge-
gramm°nvn). P. Hamb. I 15 is the sale contract, executed the very same
day.83 The contract presents the form of a homologia (P. Hamb. I 15, l. 2) and
it is termed a public document in P. Hamb. I 16 (l. 6: katå dhmÒsion xrhma-
tismÒn). There is therefore no doubt that the sale had been previously
approved by epistalma. This is also the only possible interpretation of the
words katå tÆnde tØn ımolog¤an ka‹ diå t∞w t«n §nktÆsevn biblioy2Æ[khw]
in P. Hamb. I 15, ll. 5–6.84
The reason why these two documents may interest us is the mention,
in P. Hamb. I 15, ll. 15 and 17, of a Dionysios Ptolemaios, daneistÆw, as the
true recipient, directly from the hands of the buyer Antonia Thermutar-
ion, of the price obtained by the four selling siblings, who in this way can-
celled a debt with Dionysios. For Meyer, the inclusion of this information
82 Antonia Thermutarion is also known through P. Yale III 137 (ad 216/17), BGU VII 1617
(ad 227), and P. Ross. Georg. V 58 (3rd cent. ad), all from Philadelphia.
83 Probably not the original contract, but the copy that was appended to the parathesis
request: cf. Meyer, P. Hamb. I , p. 63, on the basis of P. Hamb. I 16, l. 19: ékoloÊyvw ⁄
parey°men éntigrãfƒ toË xrhmatismoË, observing that both share the same handwriting
for the body of the document.
84 Cf. Meyer, P. Hamb. I, p. 62 n. 3, and von Woess, Urkundenwesen (cit. n. 26), p. 176 and
n. 4. Contra, Eger, Grundbuchwesen (cit. n. 40), p. 136, and H. Lewald, Beiträge zur Kennt-
nis des römisch-ägyptischen Grundbuchrechts, Leipzig 1909, pp. 55–56, 58–59, with no other
basis than the unfounded assumption that a mØ épogegramm°now could not obtain epistal-
ma: contra, cf. supra, sections 3 and 4, and Wolff, Das Recht (cit. n. 17), pp. 240–243, 248.
Kiessling, ‘Grundbuchrecht’ (cit. n. 36), p. 86, holds instead that the parathesis of a sale
did not require epistalma when the seller was a mØ épogegramm°now, and therefore refers
the above quoted words of P. Hamb. I 15 not to epistalma but to parathesis; contra, conclu-
sively, Wolff, Das Recht (cit. n. 17), p. 242 n. 91.
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in the sale contract is an oddity that calls for an explanation: it would, in
his opinion, be unconceivable, unless there is some connection between
the daneistÆw and the sold object. We must therefore assume, he con-
cludes, that the daneistÆw had a registered right on the house share as a
guarantee for his credit.
Meyer’s argumentation is not compelling. The contractual mention of
Dionysios as recipient of the payment serves to prove, in the interest of the
buyer, that the payment was made to him with the conformity of the sub-
scribing sellers. For someone who pays to a third party, such proof is cru-
cial: the payment to someone other than the creditor, it goes without say-
ing, only releases us from liability if made with his consent. And yet, there
is one reason to suspect that Meyer was right. The fact itself that Antonia
does not pay the price to the selling siblings and lets them decide its desti-
nation, but personally takes care that the creditor receives the amount. This
concern on the side of the buyer seems a clear signal that there was a secu-
rity to be cancelled.85 Whether hypothec or hypallagma, we cannot know.
If this holds true, the text acquires enormous importance: contrary to
P. Hamb. i 14, the payment to the creditor is not mentioned in the notifi-
cation to the bibliophylakes, but merely in the contract. In this case, the-
refore, it seems likely that the epistalma had been granted unconditionally,
and not made dependent on the cancellation of the debt.
Before confronting our last document, it will be useful to summarise the
conclusions reached for those examined in this and the preceding section:
a) In P. Hamb. I 14, we have full evidence of a recorded hypothec, and
of the sale of the hypothecated asset being notified to the bibliotheke. The
lack of explicit epistalma-request makes uncertain, instead, if an epistalma
was in this case expected at all, although so far no other plausible aim has
been suggested for this type of notifications by the scholarship. The same
can be said about Stud. Pal. XX 12 (= SB I 5835). where, in any case, the
obstacle for the sale was not a real security but a protopraxia. 
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85 Mitteis, Grundzüge (cit. n. 12), p. 104: ‘Wie man schon vielfach vermutet hat und wie
Hamb. 14 und 15 zu unterstützen scheinen, setzt die definitive Übertragung und épo-
grafÆ des Erwerbers wohl voraus, daß das Grundstück von Pfandrechten frei ist’.
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b) Accepting it as possible evidence of the cooperation of the biblio-
theke, P. Hamb. I 14 would by itself only prove that the sale was admitted
when aimed at cancelling the hypothec. What’s more: it could even lead
to suspect that it was admitted only in that case. 
c) This suspicion can be dispelled in the sight of P. Hamb. I 15–16, both
referring to the same sale. In the transaction documented in these two
documents, a security, although not mentioned, is very likely from the
fact that the buyer personally takes care personally in cancelling the
 seller’s debt. Despite this security, the sellers have obtained epistalma. Fur-
thermore: this epistalma seems not to have been issued on the condition
that the security is cancelled, since such cancellation is not mentioned in
the registration request addressed to the bibliophylakes.
7. P. GEN. I 44
So far, P. Gen. I 44 (= MChr. 215, ad 259, Arsinoites) has been mentioned
here only as an example of parathesis request with safeguard clause: one of
those already known to Rabel, and therefore part of the evidence that
convinced him of his theory. As I will try to show, the importance of this
source, our last, goes way beyond containing one further example of the
safeguard clause.
A certain Aurelia X, also called Thaisarion, addresses the bibliophylax
(here exceptionally only one) of the Arsinoites for the provisional registra-
tion of a 1/16 share on some property (a house, and another old house
with two towers, and an atrium, all connected) that she has bought that
same day from Aurelius Rufus. As in P. Hamb. I 15, a daneistÆw, Lucius
Anthesthius, is mentioned as the true recipient of the price, 1,500
drachms. There is though a very significant difference between the two
cases. There, the daneistÆw was mentioned in the sale contract (P. Hamb.
I 15), but omitted in the parathesis request (P. Hamb. I 16). The fact that
the price was destined to him and not to the sellers was obviously impor-
tant for the contracting parties (having the sellers’ consent to that pay-
ment documented in the contract was crucial for the buyer, as  apparently
was to make sure that the price was received for the creditor, who very
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likely therefore held a security on the sold object, as I argued supra, sub 6),
but apparently irrelevant for the record office. Here, instead, the fact that
the payment is made to Lucius Anthesthius is notified to the bibliophylax.
Not only: a receipt, attesting that the payment has in fact been made, is
attached to the parathesis request: t«n draxm«n [xvrous«n tª §nest≈s]˙
≤m°r& sÁn êllaiw efiw épÒdosin Louk¤ƒ Éanyest¤ƒ [c. 12 ÉA]ntinoe› danistª
ékoloÊyvw √ parey°mhn aÈ[toË épox]ª (ll. 24–26).
For all this I cannot imagine any explanation other than the presence of
a real security that had to be cancelled. As a rule, parathesis-requests do not
include confirmation of the payment, nor any information regarding the
recipient of the price. If the record office departs here from the ordinary
form to include all this, it must be because its relevance is not restricted to
the contracting parties: for some reason, the cancellation of the debt is in
this case relevant for the bibliotheke. And the only conceivable reason is that
the debt had been recorded as a katoche on the asset that is being sold.86
What kind of katoche we cannot know, except that it served to secure
a loan: therefore, either it was a hypothec, or a hypallagma (or a recorded
surrender of potestas alienandi equivalent to hypallagma), or, less likely, a gen-
eral katoche over the seller’s belongings for an otherwise unsecured debt.87
Why, unlike in P. Hamb. I 15 and 16, in this case, just as in P. Hamb. I 14
the aim of the sale is relevant for the record office, we cannot know. It is
clear that it was, though. The authorisation seems to have been granted
upon a condition of the price being effectively used to cancel the debt,
and the condition was determinant enough to make the buyer produce
evidence that the secured debt had been satisfied.
In any case, it is beyond doubt that the sale had been authorised, not
so much because of the parathesis-request (after all, only a request,
although cf. the official’s subscription in ll. 27–29), but because the sale
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86 So, in his introduction to the text, L. Mitteis, MChr., p. 234, invoking the parallel of
P. Hamb. I 15 and 16, for which (supra, n. 85) he also supported Meyer’s conjecture.
87 Relevant here, from the list in Mitteis, Grundzüge (cit. n. 12), p. 96, are nos. 2 and 5.
Examples of recorded hypothec and hypallagma we have already seen plenty. The sole
occurrence of a registration request for a non-alienation agreement not labelled as hypal-
lagma is P. Tebt. II 318 (= MChr. 218). The canonical example of a request to cover an unse-
cured credit with a general katoche is P. Lond. III 1157 (supra, n. 37).
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contract was a public deed: ±gÒrasa katå dhmÒsion xrhma[tismÚn diå toË
é]rxe¤ou §nyãde tª §nest≈s˙ ≤m°r& (ll. 8–9).88
From ll. 15–19 we learn as well that the seller, Aurelius Rufus, was reg-
istered by mere parathesis. The papyrus shows that this parathesis was not
done on his own name but on the name of the person who had apographe.
We cannot be sure, whether this method, that we know well for the
parathesis of katochai, was also the regular one for property.89 The person
to whose folium the parathesis of Rufus was added happened to be a minor
(éf∞lij, l. 18), a certain Longinas also called Ammonios.90
It is completely certain that Rufus’ parathesis is not that of a creditor:
if his registration to the folium of Longinas had been that of a katoche, we
would expect the document to mention it, and in order to be in the posi-
tion to sell the share he would have needed an executive procedure cul-
minating in the transcription of the property to his name. Rufus’ parathe-
88 I. Jornot & P. Schubert, Les Papyrus de Genève I, Geneva 2002 (2nd ed.), translate:
‘conformément à un acte notarié déposé ici aux archives aujourd’hui même’. We know
that in the 3rd and 4th centuries the very generic term archeion – ‘office’, is used also occa-
sionally for the bibliotheke, cf. Wolff, Das Recht (cit. n. 17), p. 27 n. 80 i.f., but this does
not seem the case here. Why would Thaisarion present twice the same acquisition to the
bibliophylax on the same day? Furthermore, in their own very likely integration, the docu-
ment is not said to have been ‘deposited’ in the archeion – as they misleadingly translate –
but to have come to existence through the archeion ([diå toË é]rxe¤ou), which by itself
makes it impossible to refer archeion to the bibliotheke. And finally, in l. 16 we have an exam-
ple of how the document refers to the bibliophylax: [k]atå parãyes[i]n diå soË. The
archeion is thus probably the office of the agoranomos, that even in the third century was
regularly used in the Fayum, unlike what was happening in Oxyrhynchos: cf. Wolff, Das
Recht (cit. n. 17), pp. 9–10, 112–113. ÉEnyãde is no obstacle for this conjecture: the generic
‘here’ refers simply to Arsinoe.
89 Together with the term parathesis and the model of the katoche, our document and some
others would favour this hypothesis: cf. P. Mil. Vogl. I 26 (ad 127/8, Tebtynis). The main
argument against this initially dominant hypothesis is the problem of the not registered
sellers: would the parathesis be in that case registered to the name of the last owner with
apographe? What would be done, then, in the, surely not infrequent, cases in which he is
not known? The argument was put forward by von Woess, Urkundenwesen (cit. n. 26),
p. 252. For the discussion and the literature, cf. Wolff, Das Recht (cit. n. 17), pp. 244–245.
90 Jornot & Schubert, P. Gen. I2, p. 181, integrate l. 18 to make him into an Aurelius
Longinas, which is very likely, but, just as in the case of Thaisarion, a mere conjecture.
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sis must therefore be that of an owner. The share that he sells now, he had
previously acquired, either by sale or by any other title, from Longinas.
Why a full apographe was not feasible for him has been the object of much
speculation.
In the second edition of P. Gen. I, I. Jornot and P. Schubert have sug-
gested many integrations for gaps that had been previously left unfilled,
not only by J. Nicole in the first edition, but also by L. Mitteis in the
Chrestomathie. Particularly important are their restitutions of lines 12, 14,
18 and 19: they completely change the facts behind the request. I repro-
duce the relevant part of the papyrus, first in Mitteis’ edition, and then
with Jornot and Schubert’s integrations highlighted:
[ ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` •kkai]d°katon m°row, ˜ §stin épÚ ≤m¤souw •kkaide-
12 [kato ` mero ` ` ofik]¤aw ka‹ •t°raw ofik¤aw dipurg¤aw palaiçw ka‹ afi-
[yr¤ou, toÊtvn t«n] tÒpvn pãntvn sunhn{n}vm°nvn éllÆloiw
[ ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` t]eim∞w érgur¤ou draxm«n xeil¤vn pentako-
[s¤vn ` ` ` ` ` ` par]å AÈrhl¤ou ÑRoÊfo[u] ÉIs¤vnow toË Papir¤ou égo-
16 [ranom(Æsantow) ka‹ …w xrhmat]¤zei, diakeim°no[u k]atå parã 
yes[i]n diå soË §p‹
[toË ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ¶touw] mhnÚw Fa«fi §pÉ [Ùn]Òmatow toË Ípoxeir¤ou
[ ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` L]oggeinç toË ka‹ Éammvn¤ou éfÆlikow ka‹ aÈ-
[ ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `] ¥misu •kkaid°kat[on] m°row
[ ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` •kkai]d°katon m°row, ˜ §stin épÚ ≤m¤souw •kkaide-
12 [katou merouw ofik]¤aw ka‹ •t°raw ofik¤aw dipurg¤aw palaiçw ka‹ afi-
[yr¤ou, toÊtvn t«n] tÒpvn pãntvn sunhn{n}vm°nvn éllÆloiw, toË
[≤m¤souw t]eim∞w érgur¤ou draxm«n xeil¤vn pentako-
[s¤vn ` ` ` ` ` ` par]å AÈrhl¤ou ÑRoÊfo[u] ÉIs¤vnow toË Papir¤ou égo-
16 [ranom(Æsantow) ka‹ …w xrhmat]¤zei, diakeim°no[u k]atå parã 
yes[i]n diå soË §p‹
[toË ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ¶touw] mhnÚw Fa«fi §pÉ [Ùn]Òmatow toË Ípoxeir¤ou
[aÈt“ ˆntow AÈrhl(¤ou)] Loggeinç toË ka‹ Éammvn¤ou éfÆ-
likow ka‹ aÈ-
[toË ¶xontow tÚ êllo] ¥misu •kkaid°kat[on] m°row
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Noticing that the sold share seems to be divided in halves
(•kkai]d°katon m°row, ˜ §stin épÚ ≤m¤souw •kkaide[kat…, ll. 11–12; ¥misu
•kkaid°kat[on] m°row, l. 19, that they read as genitive: •kkaideãkt[ou
m°]r1o`u`w`), a fact that Mitteis had ignored, they conjecture:
a) That the price of 1500 drachms, Rufus’ parathesis to the name of
Longinas and Thaisarion’s own parathesis request refer only to one half
(integrations to lines 12 and 14).
b) That the other half was not included in the price or the parathesis
because it had been registered by full apographe to the name of Rufus
(integration to line 19), and hence, despite being also bought by Thaisar-
ion, it could be left out of the parathesis and presented, in a separate
request, for full apographe.
c) The term Ípoxe¤riow at the end of l. 17, they understand as referred
to the guardianship of the still minor Longinas. Since sharing pro diviso two
halves of 1/16 of the property clearly points to a close family connection
between him and Rufus, they hypothesize that Rufus is his tutor (integra-
tion to line 18) and, indeed, a very close relative, possibly an uncle.91
In Jornot and Schubert’s reconstruction, therefore, the events would
have unfolded as follows: Rufus and Longinas, as close relatives (uncle and
nephew? brothers?) inherited each half of a share of 1/16 on the discussed
property; as heirs, they registered each his own share by full apographe;
since Longinas is a minor, also the guardianship on him fell to Rufus;
Rufus, being already Longinas’ tutor, bought his ward’s half, had it regis-
tered by parathesis, and is now selling to Thaisarion both this half and the
one registered to his own name.
This guardianship is an important piece in Jornot and Schubert’s inter-
pretation. It is the guardianship, they write, that prevents Rufus (the
tutor, in their reconstruction) from presenting full apographe for the half
91 The conjecture is plausible, but slightly capricious. According to Roman Law under
which these Aurelii theoretically live, when there is no testamentary tutor, appointed in
a will by the paterfamilias who had potestas over the minor, guardianship falls to the near-
est agnate – that is, to the closest relative on the father’s side – who fulfils the conditions
of being male and having reached puberty. Therefore: only lacking a suitable brother does
guardianship fall to the uncle; lacking even an uncle, it would fall to the cousin by male
line, and so on. Cf. Kaser, Privatrecht I2 (cit. n. 6), pp. 354–356.
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acquired from Longinas, despite the fact that the latter was époge-
gramm°now. A provisional parathesis is possible, though, because, they con-
clude, the obstacle that the guardianship represents is temporary, ending
with the guardianship itself. The parathesis will then give way to a full
apographe.92 Somewhat surprisingly, the debt cancelled by Thaisarion’s
payment seems to play for Jornot and Schubert no role in explaining the
parathesis. It would for them be sufficiently justified by the guardianship.
They do not further explain why the guardianship represents an obstacle,
but, as we will see, it truly was, albeit of a much more radical nature than
they imagine.
Under Roman Law, which should apply to these Aurelii, the legal acts
of a ward required the authorisation (auctoritas) of the guardian: without
the guardian’s supervision and approval, a ward older than seven could
acquire, but not undertake an obligation or dispose of his property.93 Sen-
sibly, and this brings us to our point, a tutor could not give auctoritas for
a transaction in which he is personally involved: in rem suam auctorem
tutorem fieri non posse.94 Such authorisation was completely void and with
it, all the effects of the transaction, except what the ward may have
acquired through it.95 This principle, crucial for protecting wards from
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92 Jornot & Schubert, P. Gen. I2 p. 178: ‘C’est selon toute vraisemblance la relation de
tutelle unissant Rufus et Longinas qui a conduit, dans le registre de la propriété, à une ins-
cription provisoire de cette vente entre Rufus et Longinas. Cette inscription provisoire est
placée en marge... du nom de Longinas, dans le registre, sans doute jusq’à la cessation de la
relation de tutelle’. And again in p. 179: ‘dans le cas de notre document, c’est apparemment
la relation de tutelle qui fait provisoirement obstacle à l’enregistrement du changement de
propriétaire. L’acheteur peut alors faire une demande d’enregistrement provisoire (parãye-
siw). Son droit sera inscrit en marge du nom du propriétaire précédent, et ainsi garanti en
attendant que la situation soit réglée et qu’un dossier puisse être ouvert à son nom.’
93 Cf. Kaser, Privatrecht I2 (cit. n. 7), pp. 275–276, 361–362.
94 Gai. 1.184, D. 26.8.1pr. (Ulpianus 1 Sab.), D. 26.8.5 (Ulpianus 40 Sab.), D. 26.8.6 (Pom-
ponius 17 Sab.), D. 26.8.7 (Ulpianus 40 Sab.); D. 26.8.22 (Labeo 5 pith.). Practically all these
sources come from commentaries to the libri tres iuris civilis by the early Imperial jurist
Masurius Sabinus, where the rule very likely was included: cf. F. Schulz, Sabinus-Fragmente
in Ulpians Sabinus-Commentar, Halle 1906 (= Labeo 10 [1964], p. 258).
95 The transaction is here said to ‘claudicate’. It produces for the ward all its positive
effects, but none of the negative. Hence the ward acquires, but he does not become
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rapacious guardians, was developed by the Roman Jurisprudence with
characteristic consistence, bordering, for the layman, on the fastidious.
Thus, for instance, since the use for trial of legis actiones was impossible
without a tutor, a trial between a woman and her own tutor would have
been impossible in Republican times, when legis actiones were the ordinary
procedure. And so the praetor had to to appoint a special tutor for these
cases, called for that reason a ‘praetorian’ tutor.96 A ward could not
become debtor to his tutor, not even if he received from him a loan or
entered a formal promise (stipulatio);97 it was useless to try to disguise the
fact by using a slave or a son under potestas to receive the promise.98 What
is more: if a tutor was indebted to his ward, the latter could not sue him
or discharge him upon payment, for in both cases the transaction, even if
beneficial for the ward, would make him lose his claim against the tutor,
which could not happen without the tutor’s authorisation, here exclud-
ed.99 It was even questioned whether a tutor could authorise a ward to
accept the inheritance of someone indebted to the tutor himself, since
that would make the ward become his debtor.100
debtor nor he loses any of his previous rights: I. 1.21pr. A good illustration, in D. 19.1.13.29
(Ulpianus 32 ed.): ‘Si quis a pupillo sine tutoris auctoritate emerit, ex uno latere constat
contractus: nam qui emit, obligatus est pupillo, pupillum sibi non obligat.’ – ‘If someone
buys from a ward without the authority of his tutor, a contract arises only on one side; the
buyer is liable to the ward, but he does not make the ward liable to him’. Cf. Kaser, Pri-
vatrecht (cit. n. 6), p. 276 n. 13, with lit.
96 Gai. 1.184, cf. M. Kaser & K. Hackl, Das römische Zivilprozessrecht, Munich 1997 (2nd
ed.), pp. 61–62 and n. 18, 206–207, with lit.
97 D. 26.8.1pr. (Ulpianus 1 Sab.). In these cases, a well known remedy introduced by Anto -
ninus Pius allowed the tutor to claim to the extent of the increase in the ward’s wealth (‘in
id quod ad eum pervenit’) so that the ward would not be enriched at his expense: cf. espe-
cially L. Labruna, Rescriptum divi Pii, Naples 1962.
98 D. 26.8.1pr. (Ulpianus 1 Sab.)
99 Arg. ex D. 26.8.22 (Labeo 5 pith.): ‘Si quid est, quod pupillus agendo tutorem suum lib-
eraturus est, id ipso tutore auctore agi recte non potest.’ – ‘If there is any action of the
ward which would have the effect of discharging the tutor from liability, it cannot be done
on the authority of the same tutor’.
100 D. 26.8.1pr. (Ulpianus 1 Sab.): the answer is positive, because the authorisation does not
aim at creating such debt, which is merely an indirect consequence of it.
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Particular attention was devoted to the case that interests us: the tutor’s
attempt to have ward’s property transferred to him with no control but his
own authority. Here, as in the other cases discussed, only when there was
plurality of tutors, an effective sale could take place, once authorised by a
fellow tutor who, having no interest in the affair, could impartially supervise
it.101 Since, however, the risk of collusion between both tutors is obvious,
even this sale was void when it could be proved that there was fraud. Some-
times a proof was not even necessary: so, according to a rescript of Severus
and Caracalla, when the transaction was disguised by using a third party.102
As it clearly results from these examples, no discussion was admitted
as to the intentions, rapacious or not, of the tutor: his authorisation for
a transaction in which he was a part was simply void. Intention was only
relevant when the transaction had been authorised by a co-tutor, in order
to prevent a fraudulent collusion between him and the tutor that was part
of the approved transaction. Hence, when Jornot and Schubert, no doubt
aware that buying from one’s own ward looks suspicious, save the honour
of our Rufus by conjecturing that his intention is to reduce the division
of the property and that the sale will not enrich him, because destined to
cancel a debt (that they seem therefore to consider common with the
ward, and hence probably inherited by both), all this, even if it could be
proved true by Rufus himself, would be completely irrelevant from the
point of view of Roman Law.103 The authorisation would be equally void.
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101 D. 26.8.5.2 (Ulpianus 40 Sab.): ‘Item ipse tutor et emptoris et venditoris officio fungi
non potest: sed enim si contutorem habeat, cuius auctoritas sufficit, procul dubio emere
potest. sed si mala fide emptio intercesserit, nullius erit momenti ideoque nec usucapere
potest. ...’  – ‘Moreover, a tutor cannot act at the same time as buyer and seller. If, how-
ever, he has a fellow-guardian, the authority of the latter will undoubtedly be sufficient for
him to buy. But if the transaction is fraudulent it will be of no effect, and hence also acqui-
sition by lapse of time will be excluded ...’
102 D. 26.8.5.3 (Ulpianus 40 Sab.): ‘Sed si per interpositam personam rem pupilli emerit, in
ea causa est, ut emptio nullius momenti sit, quia non bona fide videtur rem gessisse: et ita
est rescriptum a divo Severo et Antonino.’ – ‘If a guardian should buy property of his ward
through the interposition of a third party, the purchase will be void, because the transac-
tion does not appear to have been concluded in good faith. This was also stated in
a Rescript by the Divine Severus and by Antoninus.’
103 Jornot & Schubert, P. Gen. I2, pp. 179–180: ‘A fin the réduire le morcellement (qui
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A tutor simply could not acquire anything from his own ward. Even usu-
capio (the acquisition by lapse of time) was in this case excluded for lack
of iusta causa, for in truth there was no valid sale. There was only one pos-
sibility to acquire: to have the transaction ratified by the ward once the
guardianship is over.104
The obstacle that would arise from a guardianship, thus, would be far
from temporary: it would not disappear with the end of the guardianship;
even then it could only be only removed by the ward’s consent. In our
case, this should have excluded not only apographe but also parathesis.
True, all this construction was merely the ‘Reichsrecht’, using Mitteis’
categories, and its translation to the Egyptian realities could be, as we
well know, extremely unfaithful. In our case, the parathesis is certainly not
an unconceivable translation: a temporary registration, that would be
transformed into definitive only if on coming of age Longinas confirms
the sale. But the whole ‘guardianship’ conjecture suggested by Jornot and
Schubert presents a much more serious problem in its very fundament:
the term Ípoxe¤riow.
So far, the term is attested in only nine documents, including our own,
all of them from the third and fourth centuries ad. Preisigke, quoting the
five that had by then been edited, gives the alternative meanings of ‘sub-
ject to potestas’ or ‘subject to guardianship’.105 The ambiguity is strange,
because the term, perfect to translate the Roman notion of potestas, in the
archaic period as well known also called manus, seems for the same reason
rather inadequate for the Roman guardianship at this stage of its evolu-
tion. A review of the nine documents confirms this suspicion: none of
them refers to a ward and his or her guardian. Appearing around the time
of the Constitutio Antoniniana, the term Ípoxe¤riow, sometimes Ípoxe¤riow
a atteint l’ordre du 1/32), Rufus rachète la part de son pupille. En vendant les deux moitiés
du seizième du bien à Thaisarion, Rufus ne va cependant pas s’enrichir: le produit de la
vente va en effet passer directement à un créancier’.
104 D. 26.8.5.2 (Ulpianus 40 Sab.): ‘... sane si suae aetatis factus comprobaverit emptionem,
contractus valet.’ – ‘If, however, the ward, having attained his majority, confirms the pur-
chase, the contract will be valid.’
105 Preisigke, WB, s.v.: ‘in der Gewalt jmds stehend, unter Vormundschaft stehend’.
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katå nÒmouw or katå tÚn nÒmon, and the connected expression ÍpÚ tª
xeir‹ katå toÁw ÑRvma¤vn nÒmouw, all serve to translate the subjection of
the children to the father according to the (Roman) laws, that is, the
Roman patria potestas.106
Our Longinas is thus certainly a minor, but not under guardianship:
he is under patria potestas.107 Who his father is, we do not know, but
accepting Jornot and Schubert’s ingenious reconstruction of the text, it
would be no other than Rufus. Roman patria potestas was, as the Romans
were fully aware of, a singularity even among ancient nations:108 a power
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106 The expresion ÍpÚ tª xeir‹ katå toÁw ÑRvma¤vn nÒmouw appears in P. Oxy. IX 1208
(ad 291, Oxyrhynchos); P. Oxy. X 1268 (3rd cent. ad, Oxyrhynchos); P. Oxy XLI 2951 (ad 267,
Oxyrhynchos); SB X 10728 (ad 318, Oxyrhynchos). Hence, there can be no doubt about the
meaning of Ípoxe¤riow when associated to katå nÒmouw or katå tÚn nÒmon: BGU VII 1578
(2nd–3rd cent. ad, Philadelphia), SB I 5692 (3rd cent. ad, Oxyrhynchos); SB XVIII 13322
(3rd cent. ad, Oxyrhynchos). Nor can there be any doubt for the rest of the occurrences,
all referred explicitly to father and children: P. Diog. 18 (= P. Lond. inv. 2540 + P. Harr. I 68,
ad 225, Philadelphia [?]); P. Oxy. XIV 1703 (ad 261, Oxyrhynchos); P. Oxy. XIV 1642 (ad 289,
Oxyrhynchos); P. Panop. 28 (= SB XII 11221, ad 329, Panopolis). In P. Oxy. LIV 3758 (ad 325,
Oxyrhynchos) the use is ironic for a son ‘very much under his mother’s control’. A brief
examination of the question and the sources will be published in the next number of JJurP.
107 Cf. already H. J. Wolff, Das Recht der Griechischen Papyri Ägyptens I, Munich 2002, (ed.
by H.-A. Rupprecht), p. 139 and n. 120. That the term éf∞lij, used in l. 18 for Longinas,
unlike the Latin pupillus, does not imply subjection to guardianship, but refers merely to
the age, like the Latin impuber, and hence does not exclude patria potestas, which can be
illustrated by P. Diog. 18, where the term is used for three brothers, one of which is under
patria potestas: Mãrkoiw AÈrhl¤oiw ÉIoulò ka‹ [Loukrht¤ƒ ka‹ ÑRoÊ]fƒ éfÆliji. ı m¢n oÔn eÂw
aÈt«n ÉIoulçw Ípoxe¤riÒw §[sti t]“ fid[¤]ƒ patr‹ Mãrkƒ AÈrhl¤ƒ ÜHrvni (ll. 8–9).
108 Gai. 1.55: 
‘Item in potestate nostra sunt liberi nostri quos iustis nuptiis procreavimus. quod ius
proprium civium romanorum est; fere enim nulli alii sunt homines, qui talem in filios suos
habent potestatem, qualem nos habemus. idque divus Hadrianus edicto, quod proposuit
de his, qui sibi liberisque suis ab eo civitatem romanam petebant, significavit. nec me
praeterit galatarum gentem credere in potestatem parentum liberos esse.’  
‘In like manner, our children whom we have begotten in lawful marriage are under our
control. This right is peculiar to Roman citizens, for there are hardly any other men who
have such authority over their children as we have, and this the Divine Hadrian stated in
the Edict which he published with reference to persons who petitioned for Roman citi-
zenship for themselves and for their children. It does not escape my knowledge that the
Galatians hold that children are in the power of their parents.’
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unlimited, both in its lifelong duration and in content, so absolute109
that those subject to it could have no rights and no property. How can
it be that property has been registered by the bibliophylakes to the name
of Longinas? How, that later he transferred this property to, possibly,
his own father, with the blessings of the bibliotheke? Nothing of this is
really surprising, at least since Rafał Taubenschlag’s 1937 study on patria
potestas in the papyri.110 The Roman notion of patria potestas was simply
too Roman to be fully incorporated to the legal life in Egypt after the
Constitutio Antoniniana.111 The Roman citizens of Egypt, as well as the
public institutions, such as the bibliotheke enkteseon, use the terms associ-
ated with it, including our Ípoxeir¤ow, but ignore the lack of legal capac-
ity that these terms should carry: hence theoretical potestate subiecti are
treated as owners of their own property,112 and even registered as such.113
The logical consequence of this concept, assigning rights and property
to subordinate persons is that, while children are of minor age, their
father acts as their representative regarding their rights and property.114
109 Livy, 8.7.11, makes Manlius Torquatus use the expresion patria maiestas.
110 R. Taubenschlag, ‘Die patria potestas im Recht der Papyri’, ZRG RA 50 (1916), pp.
177–230. Cf. already Mitteis, Grundzüge (cit. n. 12), p. 275, and now Wolff & Rupprecht,
Das Recht (cit. n. 107), pp. 139–142.
111 The provincial perplexities regarding patria potestas are evident behind the consulta-
tions preserved in Justinian’s Codex under the title de patria potestate (C. 8.46).
112 For documented cases of potestate subiecti treated as owners, cf. Taubenschlag, ‘Patria
potestas’ (cit. n. 110), pp. 223–225. He concludes (p. 229 s.): ‘Noch schwächer ist der Ein-
fluß der reichsrechtlichen patria potestas im Privatrecht. Das ihr widerstrebende Prinzip
der Vermögensfähigkeit des Hauskindes war nicht zu unterdrucken und konnte auch in
der Praxis einfach nicht durchgeführt werden.’ The examples are abundant: a son in potes-
tate who has received the share of his mother’s inheritance that falls to him, in P. Diog. 18:
an appointed agoranomos who will enter office ‘upon the security of his property and that
of the children under his power’, in P. Oxy. XIV 1642; part of a house that had been bought
from a cosmetes by the three sons in potestate of an agoranomos, and is now re-transferred to
the cosmetes by the agoranomos, on behalf of his sons, in P. Oxy. XIV 1703.
113 Cf. P. Grenf. I 49 (= WChr. 248, ad 220, Antinoopolis), where a father presents apo -
graphe of a plo›on ÑEllhnikÒn with his minor son as owner.
114 Cf. SB I 5692 (3rd cent. ad, Oxyrhynchos), where a minor under potestas is considered
to be owner of a certain property that his father sells for him. In the parathesis request
011_054 alonso 2010:011_041 Ch1  1/10/12  11:35 PM  Page 48
This provincial patria potestas is substantially reduced to a sort of
guardianship over the children until they come of age.115 Our document
presents this same reality: Longinas is registered as owner by apographe,
and, in the reconstruction by Jornot and Schubert, he has inherited
together with his own father.116
Excluded the hypothesis of the guardianship, what can have been the
obstacle for Rufus’ apographe? Certainly not patria potestas, if we accept
that he was Longinas’ father. If patria potestas is not an obstacle to assign
ownership to Longinas, to the point of allowing him full registration of
his right, it certainly can be no obstacle for transferring such right to his
father, by sale or for any other cause. Nor is it easy to imagine how patria
potestas could provide a basis for referring Rufus’ parathesis to some sort of
katoche rather than to an acquisition: katochai of the children on the par-
ents’ property we know from the Edict of Mettius Rufus, but there is no
liability or right to explain a katoche of the father on the property of his
children. Rufus must have acquired from Longinas, his son or not, and he
had to yield to some obstacle that prevented a full apographe and accept
a registration by provisional parathesis. And there is no obstacle left but
the daneistÆw, Lucius Anthesthius, his credit, that Thaisarion paid for,
and the katoche securing that credit, that in this case may be conjectured
beyond doubt (cf. supra, at the beginning of this section 7).117 And, if this
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PSI X 1126, the father acts purely and simply as tutor of his minor children to have their
property registered, and presents himself as such: [metå kur¤o]u toË patrÚw AÈrhl¤ou
ÑErm2[¤ou] (l. 6, reconstruction practically certain).
115 Taubenschlag, ‘Patria potestas’ (cit. n. 110), p. 229: ‘Was zunächst den Begriff selbst
anbelangt, so hat dieser wohl bei den Provinzialen Eingang gefunden, doch blieb neben
ihm die alte Auffassung der patria potestas als Vormundschaft weiterhin bestehen.’
116 For a son who owns property together with his father, cf. P. Oxy IV 705 (= WChr. 153,
ad 202, Oxyrhynchos). For a son who inherits from his mother despite remaining in potes-
tate patris, cf. P. Diog. 18 (= P. Lond. inv. 2540 + P. Harr. I 68, ad 225, Philadelphia [?]).
117 So MChr.: ‘Rufus hatte seinerseits früher vom éf∞lij Loggeinçw gekauft, dabei aber
nur parãyesiw des Kaufs erlangt, nicht épografÆ erstattet.  ... Es lag ... auf dem gekauf-
ten Grundstück ein Pfandrecht, dessen Inhaber gerade erst mit dem Kaufgeld bezahlt
wird. Es ist kaum zu bezweifeln, daß gerade dieses Pfandrecht bisher die épografÆ ver-
hindert hatte.’ Cf. also Kiessling, ‘Grundbuchrecht’ (cit. n. 36), p. 89.
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was the obstacle for Rufus’ apographe, it must have existed before he
acquired the share.118 This seems trivial, but has for us a very important
consequence: the share underwent not one but two alienations despite
the katoche. The second one, from Rufus to Thaisarion, aimed, as we
know (cf. the beginning of this section), at cancelling the katoche. Indeed,
the bibliotheke seems to have authorised it only on this condition, to the
point that Thaisarion presented, together with her parathesis request, evi-
dence that the holder of the katoche had received his due. The first alien-
ation, instead, from Longinas to Rufus, if a sale at all, clearly did not bring
about the cancellation of the katoche. Yet it was authorised and, more
importantly, registered. The authorisation is proved by the registration;
and the registration proves that for the bibliotheke the satisfaction of the
creditor was this time immaterial.
With the available documents, this is as near as we may get to finding
an alienation not aimed at cancelling a katoche and yet authorised by the
bibliotheke despite the katoche itself. The only slight reservation comes
from the possibility, not certainty, that the contracting parties were
father and son, and that the authorisation was exceptionally granted for
some unfathomable reason related to that fact.
*
In the early twentieth century, the non-alienation principle behind the
Graeco-Egyptian system of real securities attracted the attention of a
generation of legal papyrologists educated in the categories of Roman
Law. The Roman principle of alienability, that allowed the debtor to keep
his potestas alienandi, at least for immovables, contrasted sharply with the
growing awareness that in the papyri, despite many uncertainties that still
remain (section 1), the rule was indeed the opposite.
118 The katoche could have been constituted by Longinas’ father, acting for him, or it could
have been inherited. This wouldn’t prevent Longinas’ apographe: he is not a buyer but
a successor. The hypothesis creates a difficulty for Jornot and Schubert’s assumption of
a shared inheritance: the katoche would have fallen on both shares, breaking thus their idea
that Thaisarion’s parathesis referred only to one of them because she was entitled to a full
apographe of the other.
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For the enforcement of this non-alienation agreement, a new era
arrived with the introduction, in the last third of the first century ad, of
the bibliotheke enkteseon (section 2). Compared with previous mechanisms,
such as depriving the debtor of his title deeds, this new property record
office, that registered not only property, but also real securities and other
holds on it, would seem to provide the perfect infrastructure for pre-
venting any alienation attempt by the debtor. Perfect it was not, though.
We may leave aside the not so occasional frightening reports of inade-
quate keeping of the archives and diastromata, and our own uncertainties,
regarding, for instance, the validity of a notarial deed executed without
the preceptive authorisation of the bibliotheke. Even ignoring all this, the
system itself left many unguarded flanks. It seems to have been compul-
sory only for immovables, and only regarding transactions executed
through the local notarial offices of the agoranomeion and the grapheia. Pri-
vate deeds (cheirographa), their transformation in Alexandria into public
deeds by demosiosis, and the equally alexandrine synchoreseis, all were con-
cluded without any control by the bibliothekai enkteseon.
Be that as it may, for the transactions that fell within their competence,
and regarding real securities registered through them as katochai, the bib-
liothekai were in the perfect position to block the sale: denying authorisa-
tion (epistalma) and registration to the sale attempts of the debtor, as
sometimes explicitly required by those contracting the security: v. gr. by
the hypallagmatic debtors in P. Wisc. ii 54, P. Kron. 18 and P. Vars. 10 iii.
And yet (section 3), according to an often repeated theory first
launched by E. Rabel, contrary to what we would expect, they did not
always proceed that way: Rabel argued that the bibliophylakes would rather
merely deny the buyer a definitive registration (apographe), forcing him to
a provisional parathesis, explicitly acknowledging the primacy of the cred-
itor’s right over his own.
Rabel’s theory found widespread approval and remains unchallenged.
Yet, it has never been thoroughly checked with the sources, and its
importance does not seem to have been fully acknowledged. If the  theory
holds true, it implies a virtual withdrawal from the non-alienation princi-
ple, and thus one of the deepest changes in the history of the Greek real
securities. The katoche is transmuted, from a strict hold blocking the
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alienation, into a guarantee for the creditor that his registered right will
prevail over the provisionally registered buyer. The system becomes
immensely more flexible, and notably close to the Roman one: the debtor
is free to sell, and it is made sure that the creditor’s right will anyway pre-
vail over the new owner. Only the means to protect the creditor diverge:
the Roman system extends the claim erga omnes characteristic of owners
to a non-owner like the creditor, thus making him prevail even over a new
owner in good faith. Here, instead, the buyer is denied a definitive regis-
tration, and forced in the provisional one to acknowledge the creditor’s
previously registered katoche as prevailing over his own right. In other
words: instead of raising the creditor to a position protected erga omnes
like that of an owner (a position that the hypothecarian creditor, unlike
the hypallagmatic one, seems to have had anyway), this system weakens
the position of the buyer, as the parathesis formula expressly enunciates.
The strategy seems coherent with the logic of the non-alienation clause,
and devised, remarkably, without the aid of a legal science like that of the
Romans, to which we owe the category of the ‘real’ rights.
How does the theory hold with the sources? Much of the direct evi-
dence for sales authorised despite a recorded katoche, reviewed in sections
5–7, concerns, unsurprisingly, sales followed by immediate cancellation of
the secured debt. Such is the case of: a) P. Hamb. I 14 (209/10, Arsinoites),
a notification of sale regarding property under a recorded hypothec,
where the lack of explicit epistalma request leaves open the question if it
could be expected at all; b) P. Gen. I 44 (= MChr. 215, ad 259, Arsinoites),
a provisional parathesis request of a sale, undoubtedly authorised by epi -
stalma, despite the fact that the debt that the sale served to cancel was in
all likelihood secured by a recorded katoche; c) it seems also the case of 
P. Hamb. I 15 and 16, where, as Meyer suggested, the debt that the sale
aims at cancelling was very probably secured by the sold object.
P. Hamb. I 14 and P. Gen. I 44 have still something else in common: they
care to make the aim of the sale known to the bibliophylakes. In P. Hamb. I
14, the debtor, Herais, duly notifies, together with her intention to sell,
that she will receive only part of the price: the rest shall be paid by the
buyer to her creditor. In P. Gen. I 44, the buyer, Thaisarion, not only ends
her parathesis request declaring to have paid to the creditor his due, but
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also produces evidence to confirm it. All this raises the impression that for
the petitioners, in these cases at least, the cancellation of the debt secured
by the katoche was essential to obtain the cooperation of the bibliotheke.
Yet, the sources do not justify the conclusion that such cancellation
was always required by the bibliotheke as a condition for the authorisation
and registration of the sale. An argument to the contrary can be found in
P. Hamb. I 16, where the buyer’s parathesis-request does not care to men-
tion this circumstance to the bibliophylakes. The clause safeguarding the
rights of owners and holders of katochai, constant in provisional parathesis
requests, deposes also in the same sense, as Rabel justly observed (section
4). The katoche-part of the clause cannot have merely served for a case
where the secured debt had just been cancelled and therefore the katoche
itself, although still formally in the records, had to be immediately can-
celled by the creditor. Neither can it have been a mere precaution against
possible katochai undetected by the epistalma and parathesis granting biblio-
phylakes: most katochai simply cannot go undetected because they exist
only if recorded on the owner’s folium in the diastromata.
The only possible conclusion, thus, is that, at least in some cases, the bib-
liotheke would authorise and parathetically register sales whose aim was not
the cancellation of the registered katoche. One such case hides in all likeli-
hood behind the same P. Gen. I 44. The alienation now recorded (Rufus →
Thaisarion) had been preceded by another one (Longinas → Rufus), equally
recorded by parathesis, despite the fact that the item was already under
katoche. And, on this occasion at least, the bibliotheke registered the acquisi-
tion by parathesis although the secured debt had not been and would not
immediately be cancelled: the anomalous circumstance that someone would
acquire a pledged property without requesting immediate cancellation of
the pledge may be explained by a close family connection between Rufus
and Longinas, very probably father and son.119 And, although the case con-
cerns a protopraxia and not a real security, in the instance of Stud. Pal. XX 12
(= SB I 5835, 2nd cent. ad, Arsinoites), a notification of sale is presented to
the bibliotheke, with explicit mention of the protopraxia, that is not destined
to be cancelled until the minor who holds it comes of age.
Why the sales in P. Hamb. I 15-16, P. Gen. I 44 (first sale) and Stud. Pal.
XX 12 could be made with the unreserved cooperation of the record
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 office, as many others were, if the safeguard clause in the parathesis  formula
has any sense, and yet in other cases, like P. Hamb. I 14 and P. Gen. I 44
(final sale), such cooperation seems restricted to the cancellation-case, we
do not know. A difference between hypothec and hypallagma is not to be
excluded:120 the latter consisting in a mere non-alienation agreement very
possibly deprived of real effect, its enforcement could seem more urgent
for the creditor than to the hypothecarian one, who is, through forfeit, a
conditional owner. Maybe it is not by chance that all explicit requests for
epistalma denial (P. Wisc. II 54, P. Kron. 18 and P. Vars. 10 iii) come  precisely
from the field of hypallagma.
A final remark. All the documents that we have reviewed come from
the Arsinoites. So far, in fact, no provisional parathesis-request containing
a safeguard clause and promising a future apographe has been found in any
other nomos (a complete list, supra, n. 55–56). This parathesis model seems
to have been developed only in Fayum, and the whole new alienability
system depended on it. The documents so far available, therefore, speak
of Rabel’s theory as a Fayum phenomenon.
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